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PRICING THE CLOUD: AN AUCTION APPROACH 
Yang Lu 
Old Dominion University, 2020 
Chair: Dr. Li D. Xu 
Cloud computing has changed the processing and service modes of information 
communication technology and has affected the transformation, upgrading and innovation of the 
IT-related industry systems. The rapid development of cloud computing in business practice has 
spawned a whole new field of interdisciplinary, providing opportunities and challenges for 
business management research. 
One of the critical factors impacting cloud computing is how to price cloud services. An 
appropriate pricing strategy has important practical means to stakeholders, especially to 
providers and customers. This study addressed and discussed research findings on cloud 
computing pricing strategies, such as fixed pricing, bidding pricing, and dynamic pricing. 
Another key factor for cloud computing is Quality of Service (QoS), such as availability, 
reliability, latency, security, throughput, capacity, scalability, elasticity, etc. Cloud providers 
seek to improve QoS to attract more potential customers; while, customers intend to find QoS 
matching services that do not exceed their budget constraints.  
Based on the existing study, a hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism, which consists of 
subscription and dynamic auction design, is proposed and illustrated to cloud services. The 
results indicate that our hybrid pricing mechanism has potential to better allocate available cloud 
resources, aiming at increasing revenues for providers and reducing expenses for customers in 
practice.  
   
 
The proposed hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism has the following advantages. (1) 
Solving problems of fixed pricing strategy. The price of a resource cannot be dynamically 
modified based on resource usage between supply and demand. Cloud providers will suffer 
potential revenue loss due to more potential customers will be involved and price will be 
fluctuated. The QoS level and performance of the cloud services obtained is directly related to 
the expenses a customer needs to pay. If the same amount of cloud services is used, the higher 
the performance or the higher QoS level of cloud services a customer requires, the higher prices 
of the related cloud services will be. (2) The QoS-based pricing model can present a clear 
reserved price to both providers and customers. Differentiated QoS threshold represents different 
prices to cloud services; the price itself reflects the user's preference for QoS. Overall, the hybrid 
pricing mechanism can explore both the two pricing strategies’ advantages and to provide 
supplier and customer expected benefits. (3) Attractive to customers. Based on budget 
constraints, customers could customize cloud services as they expect. Customers have good 
opportunity to price/bid the expected cloud services.  
As a research on cloud computing, this study is one of leading papers that focus on 
estimating values of various types of cloud services by mathematical auction design and 
operational allocation. Some study explores the ideas about fixed pricing strategies, such as pay-
per-use, subscription, tiered pricing, and free-of-charge; some study pays more attention on 
different dynamic pricing mechanisms, such as financial mathematical models and auction 
designs. This thesis is the first writing talking about a hybrid pricing design that is consists of 
subscription and dynamic auction design for both existing and newcomers of companies to 
develop cloud computing in the markets. More important, a QoS-based reference price is 
   
 
proposed for both provider and customer, ideally, most of popular QoS indicators are embedded 
in the reserved pricing model.  
This study is a very good attempt to explore cloud pricing strategy. Most of the studies 
discuss various cloud pricing strategies from technological or mathematical perspective, but the 
pricing mechanisms are difficult to implement in practice because they ignore marketing 
conditions, such as supply and demand, and difficulties of companies, such as usage preference 
or budget constraint. In this thesis, a real marketing environment is constructed, both existing 
companies and newcomers would obtain some insights and benefits if they have chance to put 
the hybrid pricing mechanisms into practice. Firstly, companies can judge the development status 
of its cloud computing, such as the initiating, developing, and maturing stages. Secondly, 
providers can improve the comprehensive quality of cloud resources based on different QoS 
expectations from end-users, such as scalability, elasticity, availability, latency, reliability, 
security, throughput, capacity, etc. Thirdly, both providers and customers can obtain an accurate 
estimated reference price. The hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism has potential to guide 
providers and customers in the cloud industry. 
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This thesis is dedicated to the proposition 




















































My time as a PhD student at Old Dominion University has been supported by many kinds 
of people. This page attempts to recognize those who have been most helpful along the way. 
First of all, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Li D. Xu. His advice, support and 
kind encouragement on both professional and private issues have effectively guided me through 
this winding way. Furthermore, he always led my papers to clear, smart and persuade ones. 
Without his great support, this thesis would not have been possible. 
I am also very grateful to my advisor, Dr. Xianrong, Zheng. His professional expertise 
and unique thinking into both computer science and information technology stimulated me to 
brainstorm and systematically design the appropriate mechanisms. 
At the same time, I am also indebted to my department chair and advisor, Dr. Ling Li. 
Her experience, technique and insight into information systems and decision sciences have 
immensely supported me in designing the mechanism and developing the contexts. 
Thanks to my committee member and advisor, Dr. Kayoung Park. She provided me with 
very valuable mathematical and validating mechanisms. I couldn’t make this great progress 
without her valuable suggestions and great support.  
Thanks to my director Dr. Mitsue Shiokawa. During the first-three-year of my PhD study, 
recommended by Dr. Xu and Dr. Li, she hired me as a part-time data analyst for ODU Online to 
financially support me and my family. 
My PhD study is different from most PhD cases. My PhD study consists of two 
components, a three-year full-time study and a two-year full-time university lecturer. After three-
years full-time studies, under the guidance and support of Dr. Xu and Dr. Li, I got a great chance 
to become a full-time lecturer at College of Charleston. I was a Visiting Assistant Professor in 
   
 
viii 
the Department of Supply Chain and Information Management. I have been working there for 
two years since August 2018. After two-years discipline, I am capable of teaching courses 
related to Business Analytics and Decision Sciences. Such as Management Information Systems, 
Data Visualization, Operational Management, etc. Thanks to the Department Chair Dr. Giaconda 
Quesada, Professor Marvin Gonzalez, and the Secretary Mrs. Sabrina Holloway! Without their 
strong support and training, I cannot be transitioning from a PhD candidate to an academic 
professor. 
Thanks to my PhD administrator, Mrs. Katrina J. Davenport. Every time that I had any 
concerns about study and graduating, she always could find an appropriate approach along with 
useful information to help me out. 
Special thanks to my family, my father and mother, my wife, and my three little boys. 
Without their consideration and effort, I cannot smoothly finish my PhD degree. 
In addition, I have benefited from time spent with friends at ODU. Interdisciplinary 
discussions with these friends have opened my eyes greatly than expected before.  
Each devoted significant time and effort to my thesis, and their suggestions and 


























A            Availability  
𝐴             The function of availability and cloud resource  
𝐴𝑠𝑘             The asking price from provider j 
𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑅𝐸𝑉        The reserved price of provider j 
𝐵             Customer i’s bidding price   
𝐵             Provider j’s bidding price  
𝐵𝑖𝑑             The bidding price from customer i 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑉        The reserved price of customer i 
C            The cost of cloud resource  
𝑑
∗
            The bid density of customer 𝑖∗ 
d            The number of luxury or of high-demand customers 
E            Elasticity   
𝐸             The function of elasticity and cloud resource   
F(X)            The function of reserved price  
g            The number of poor or of low-demand customers   
G            The set of all the possible strategy of a game   
i            Customer i  
𝑖             The losing bidders 
j            Provider j  
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑             The workload of provider j 
M            There exist m sellers, M = {𝑚 , j = 1, 2, …, m} 
   
 
xi
N            There exist n customers, N = {𝑛 , j = 1, 2, …, n} 
𝑂             The other factor impacting the order and price of customer i 
P            The marketing price  
𝑃             The fixed price  
𝑃             The equilibrium price  
𝑃             A winning customer i’s payment 
𝑃             The reserved price  
𝑃             The trading price  
𝑃( )            The Price when demand is high 
𝑃( )            The Price when demand is low 
Q            The requests from all customers 
𝑄             The service request from customer i  
𝑄             The quantity for certain cloud service that customer wins and uses  
R            Reliability   
𝑅             The function of reliability and cloud resource 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥       The maximum of resources that provider j can provide   
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑     The respond time of 𝑄  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑      The total number of other accepted resource requests between time t and the deadline   
S            Security  
𝑠             The game strategy of a certain unit   
𝑆             The set of game strategies for a certain activity   
𝑆             The function of security and cloud resource   
𝑡             The initiating point  
𝑡             The time when the marketing price equals cost  
   
 
xii
𝑡             The time when the marketing price equals the fixed price 
𝑡             The time when the marketing price equals the equilibrium price 
𝑇             The length of time the winning customer i will use the service 
V            The true value of cloud resource  
𝑉             The true expected value from customer i  
𝑉             The true expected value from provider j 
X            The QoS metrics  
𝑋             Customer Consumption level when demand is high 
𝑋             Customer Consumption level when demand is low 
𝑋             All levels of cloud resources from a customer i 
𝑋             All levels of cloud resources from a provider j 
𝑋( , )           Customer Maximal Consumption level when demand is high 
𝑋( , )           Customer Maximal Consumption level when demand is low 
𝑈             Utility 
𝛼             The degree of impact of the workload on the asking price 


















         Page 
 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... xvii  
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. xviii  
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1  
1.1 Cloud Computing and Information Systems ..............................................................1 
1.2 Purpose and Contribution ............................................................................................3 
1.3 Method and Procedure .................................................................................................4 
1.3.1 Marketing conditions. ..............................................................................................4  
1.3.2 The Function of QoS-based reserved price. .............................................................6 
1.3.3 The Hybrid pricing mechanisms ..............................................................................6 
1.4 Outline of The Thesis ....................................................................................................7 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ..............................................................................................9  
2.1 Introduction to Cloud ...................................................................................................9 
2.1.1 The Concept of Cloud Computing and The Basic Elements ...................................9 
2.1.2 The Features of Cloud Computing .........................................................................10 
2.1.3 The Three Service Models of Cloud Computing ...................................................11 
2.1.4 The Four Deployment Models of Cloud Computing .............................................15  
2.1.5 The Potential Business Values of Cloud Computing .............................................16  
2.1.6 The Risks of Cloud Computing .............................................................................17 
2.2 Game Theory and Auction Design .............................................................................19 
   
 
xiv
2.2.1 Concept of Game Theory .......................................................................................19 
2.2.2 Elements of Game Theory .....................................................................................20 
2.2.3 Classification of Game Theory ..............................................................................20 
2.2.4 Nash Equilibrium ...................................................................................................21  
2.2.5 Cases of Nash Equilibrium ....................................................................................22 
2.2.5 Different types of auction processes ......................................................................25 
2.2.6 Conditions of auction design .................................................................................30  
2.3 Cloud Pricing Mechanisms .........................................................................................32 
2.3.1 Fixed pricing strategy ............................................................................................34 
2.3.2 Dynamic pricing strategy .......................................................................................36 
2.3.3 Bidding pricing strategy .........................................................................................37 
2.3.4 Amazon AWS EC2 (Elastic Compute Cloud) Spot Instance ................................39 
2.4 Unsolved Issues from the Extant Cloud Pricing Strategy .......................................41 
2.4.1 Issues of Fixed Pricing Strategy. ...........................................................................41 
2.4.2 Quality of Service (QoS) of Cloud Computing .....................................................41 
QOS-BASED HYBRID PRICING STRATEGY ......................................................................45  
3.1 Developing Stages of Cloud Industry ........................................................................47 
3.1.1 The Initiating Stage ................................................................................................48 
3.1.2 The Developing Stage ............................................................................................48 
3.1.3 The Maturing Stage ................................................................................................49  
3.2 Quality of Service (QoS) of Cloud Pricing ................................................................51 
3.2.1 The Relation between QoS Metrics and Price .......................................................51 
3.2.2 An Example of Relation between Availability and Price ......................................51 
   
 
xv
QOS-BASED CLOUD PRICING MODEL...............................................................................55  
4.1 Subscription for The Initiating Stage ........................................................................56 
4.1.1 Problem Statement .................................................................................................56  
4.1.2 Provider Optimization ............................................................................................56 
4.1.3 Customer Optimization ..........................................................................................57  
4.1.4 The Analysis of Different Types of Customer .......................................................58 
4.2 Dynamic Auction Design for Both Developing and Maturing Stages ....................63 
4.2.1 Problem Statement .................................................................................................63  
4.2.2 Proposition and Conditions ....................................................................................64  
4.3 The Bidding Procedure ...............................................................................................65 
4.3.1 Step I: Reserved QoS-based Pricing Model...........................................................65 
4.3.2 Step II: Bids Submission ........................................................................................66 
4.3.3 Step III: Pairing Bids .............................................................................................66 
4.3.4 Step IV: Winner Determination .............................................................................66 
4.3.5 Step V: Marketing Price Calculation .....................................................................67  
4.3.6 Step VI: Transaction ..............................................................................................67 
LIMITATION AND FUTURE DIRECTION ...........................................................................69  
5.1 The Issues of Current Cloud Pricing Mechanisms...................................................69 
5.2 The Marketing Condition of Supply and Demand ...................................................70 
5.3 The Decentralized Cloud Trading Platform .............................................................70 
5.2.1 Adaptability of Blockchain in Cloud Computing ..................................................71  
5.2.2 Theoretical Framework ..........................................................................................72 
5.2.3 Peer-to-Peer Trading Mechanism ..........................................................................75 
   
 
xvi
5.2.4 Calculate Node Reputation Values and Matching Ranges ....................................76 
5.2.5 Comparison between Traditional and Decentralized Trading Systems .................77 
5.4 The Impact of QoS-based Pricing Strategy on Customer Purchasing Behavior ..78 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................82  
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................122  
A.1 Comparison between Subscription and Pay-Per-Use ...........................................122 
A.1.1 The Homogeneous Customer ..............................................................................122  
A.1.2 The Heterogeneous Customer .............................................................................125  
A.2 Dynamic Auction Design is Superb to Fixed Pricing Strategy .............................133 
A.2.1 Monotonicity .......................................................................................................133  
A.2.2 A Double Auction is better than Subscription ....................................................134 
VITA............................................................................................................................................136  




   
 
xvii




Table                                   Page 
 
1. Pricing Strategies of Three Development Stages.........................................................................7 
 
2. Resources of Service Models .....................................................................................................14 
 
3. Prisoner’s Dilemma ...................................................................................................................22 
 
4. A Beauty’s Choice .....................................................................................................................24 
 
5. Pricing Strategies of Cloud Services from Different Companies ..............................................32 
 
6. Comparison of The Four Major Fixed Pricing Strategies ..........................................................35 
 
7. Dynamic Pricing Strategies ........................................................................................................36 
 
8. Different Types of Auction Design ............................................................................................38 
 
9. Amazon AWS Spot Instance Study ...........................................................................................40 
 
10. Developing Stages and Pricing Strategies ...............................................................................50 
 
11. Representation of Availability .................................................................................................52 
 
12. Differences between Centralized and Decentralized Trading Platform ..................................76 
 






   
 
xviii 




Figure                           Page 
 
1. A Comprehensive View of Cloud Computing ...........................................................................10 
 
2. Service Models and Providers ...................................................................................................12 
 
3. Deployment Models of Cloud Computing .................................................................................16 
 
3. Taxonomy of Auction Design ....................................................................................................26 
 
4. Different Bidding Directions of Auctions ..................................................................................30 
 
5. Critical QoS Metrics of Cloud Services.....................................................................................43 
 
6. SLA between Customer’ and Provider’ QoS .............................................................................44 
 
7. Different Developing Periods of Cloud Industry .......................................................................47 
 
8. Transaction of Cloud Allocation and Pricing ............................................................................56 
 
9. The Detailed QoS-based Bidding Procedure .............................................................................68 
 
10. Blockchain-based Decentralized Cloud Trading Platform ......................................................73 
 




























This chapter is dedicated to describing the overall idea of the study. 
 
1.1 Cloud Computing and Information Systems 
Since its inception, cloud computing has been emphasizing its business model in the real 
world. The success of the business of cloud computing is largely achieved by developing a 
reasonable and advanced pricing mechanism [1-5]. It is critical to develop a pricing strategy for 
cloud service that helps providers grasp competitive advantage and obtain more revenues. At the 
same time, the fundamental changes in the way of work and business are brought by cloud 
computing, leading to the separation of customer and computing resources [6-11]. When 
customers need computing resources, they only need to pay a fee to cloud providers. Hence, a 
viable pricing strategy is needed to fulfill the requirements of customers [12-18].  
Cloud computing not only has a huge impact on the application of information storage, 
interaction and computing technologies, but also promotes a new round of business innovation 
and revolution [19-23]. From the end of 2006, IT giants Google and Amazon started promoting 
cloud computing industry. Subsequently, companies such as IBM, Microsoft, AT & T and 
SalesForce followed and launched their own cloud services [24-26]. Cloud computing is an 
Internet-based and infrastructure-shared IT service model. By virtualizing and dynamically 
configuring computing resources, platform, software, hardware, and data-related services can be 
provided. Customers do not need to purchase equipment in advance or care about specific 
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computing processes or maintenances. They only need to submit a request to get the service and 
then pay based on the usage [27, 33]. 
Cloud computing, as an emerging and popular terminology in the ICT industry, is 
potential to revolutionize the way that companies process business intelligence. Customers do 
not need to purchase equipment in advance or care about specific computing processes or 
maintenances [34, 35]. They only need to submit a request to get the service and then pay based 
on the usage. It is of great practical significance to develop a pricing strategy for cloud service 
that helps providers grasp competitive advantage and obtain more revenues. It has become the 
development of the national core strategy of the next generation of information technology [36-
39]. Currently, leading IT companies are gearing up to make business in cloud services: 
Amazon.com, Google, Microsoft, and IBM. These companies develop cloud computing focusing 
on different cloud services that consisting of the power of cloud computing and the Internet [40-
43]. 
With the continuous developing accomplishment of cloud computing and the increasing 
requirement of cloud services, the cloud computing service market has entered a period of rapid 
growth. Faced with the competition among the cloud industry, cloud pricing will be transformed 
from the unilateral (fixed) pricing strategies focusing on provider’s revenue to the bilateral 
(dynamic optimal auction) pricing strategies that benefit to both provider and customer, which 
will be more suitable for the development of cloud computing [44, 45]. Meanwhile, companies 
will seek potential approaches to accompany with cloud computing for normal operation 
activities and information system-related transition; individuals will use more cloud-based 
services and resources through the Internet or other possible network systems [46, 47]. 
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1.2 Purpose and Contribution 
I address the issue of designing a novel hybrid QoS-based auction design, through which 
cloud services are distributed between providers and customers, along with different pricing 
strategies, i.e., subscription and double auction procedure. The goals are to (1) propose QoS-
embedded metrics to price and match cloud services between different provider’ services and 
customers’ expectations, (2) construct a combination of fixed pricing and bidding pricing 
strategies to provision available services between multiple providers and customers, and (3) 
flexibly and dynamically set up a hybrid QoS-based pricing strategy to optimize provider 
revenues.  
This study potentially plays important roles in academia and practice. This is the first 
paper combine QoS metrics (technological perspective of cloud computing) and dynamic pricing 
mechanisms (subscription and auction design) together. It is potential to offer certain insights 
and guidance for researchers who are interested in cloud pricing. Variety of auction can be 
designed and explored, especially double and combinatorial auction designs. QoS metrics are 
good variables to estimate values of cloud computing, and cloud computing includes other 
technological factors impacting the overall performance and price. A hybrid QoS-based pricing 
mechanism is built to effectively distribute available cloud resources based on marketing 
conditions, such as when supply > demand, pricing strategy is different based on marketing 
price. The pricing strategy adopted with should benefit to providers or customers, aiming at 
achieving better outcomes. The model presents an appropriate reserved price of cloud resources, 
which will be as reference to both providers and customers. Throughout the complete pricing 
process, a provider could easily locate its own pricing strategies and the status of its cloud 
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computing development; a customer could easily seek available cloud services based on its own 
QoS expectations and budget constraints. 
 
1.3 Method and Procedure 
Based on pricing theory in marketing (supply and demand) and game theory in 
economics, I construct three cloud development stages that represent different relations between 
supply and demand. Such as the initiating stage, the developing stage, and the maturing stage. 
For each stage, I propose an appropriate pricing strategy. For instance, in the initiating stage, 
subscription (fixed pricing strategy) is proposed, which is better than a pay-per-use pricing 
strategy; for both the developing and maturing stages, dynamic auction design is adopted with, 
which  can help providers attract more potential customers and obtain more revenues and assist 
customers figure out cloud prices and save expenses. According to mathematical proof, the 
proposed hybrid pricing mechanism has certain advantages and can fulfill different expectations 
for customers and providers. The details are illustrated in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. 
 
1.3.1 Marketing conditions.  
The initiating stage is between 𝑡  ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the cost 
of cloud resource (C). In the market, there are only a few customers with plenty of cloud 
resources from multiple providers. This stage is not a good time for companies to gain revenues, 
but to attract potential customers. Also, it is not necessary to change the price instantly. A better 
pricing strategy for company to adopt with is to offer customers discount or promotional price. 
An example is Amazon AWS who offers customers free-of-charge for certain cloud services for 
one year.  
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The developing stage is between 𝑡  ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the 
fixed price of cloud resource (𝑃 ) but higher than the cost of cloud resource (C). In the market, 
the quantity of customers will be increasing, due to the cloud marketing is growing. This stage is 
the first time for companies to gain revenues. But, if a company adopts with the fixed pricing 
strategy, it may encounter potential revenue loss that expressed in Figure 3-1. Hence, it is better 
for a company to seek to change the price instantly. A better pricing strategy for company to 
adopt with is to offer customers dynamic price. The price will be modified based on marketing 
fluctuation between supply and demand. Although for a certain customer’s resources, a provider 
offers a lower price, a lower price based on supply and demand will attract more customers to 
purchase cloud resources, leading to the economies of scale. Companies will obtain more 
revenues overall eventually. An example is Amazon AWS who offers customers Spot Instance 
for certain cloud services.  
The maturing stage is between 𝑡  ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the 
equilibrium price of cloud resource (𝑃 ) but higher than the fixed price of cloud resource (𝑃 ). In 
the market, the quantity of customers will be increasing, due to the cloud marketing is growing. 
This stage is the second time for companies to gain revenues. But, if a company adopts with the 
fixed pricing strategy, it may encounter potential revenue loss that expressed in Figure 3-1. 
Hence, it is better for a company to seek to change the price instantly. A better pricing strategy 
for company to adopt with is to offer customers dynamic price. The price will be modified based 
on marketing fluctuation between supply and demand. An example is Amazon AWS who offers 
customers Spot Instance for certain cloud services. 
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1.3.2 The Function of QoS-based reserved price. 
The QoS metrics (X) is consisting of availability (𝐴( )), reliability (𝑅 ), elasticity (𝐸 ), etc. 
The bidding price is based on the reserved price (𝑃 ) that is applicable to both seller and buyer. x 
refers to all possible features that influence the performance of QoS in cloud computing, such as 
CPU power, speed, storage, location, etc. 
The QoS metrics (X): 
𝑋 
A (Availability), 𝐴  
E (Elasticity), 𝐸  
R (Reliability), 𝑅  
S (Security), 𝑆  
… 
The function that expresses the reserved price is: 
          𝑃  = 𝐹(𝑋) = 𝐹(𝐴𝑥, 𝐸𝑥, 𝑅𝑥, 𝑆𝑥, … )  
 
1.3.3 The Hybrid pricing mechanisms  
The hybrid QoS-based piecing mechanism consists of subscription and dynamic auction 
design for different marketing conditions between supply and demand. For instance, in the 
initiating stage, a subscription pricing strategy will be used, aiming at attracting potential 
customers and expanding marketing share; in the developing and maturing stages, a dynamic 
double auction pricing strategy will be employed to benefit to both providers and customers. 
Specifically, when the cost of cloud resource is higher than the marketing  price in cloud market 
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(the initiating stage), a fixed subscription price strategy will be adopted; when the marketing 
price is higher than the cost of cloud resource but lower than the fixed price of cloud resource 
(the developing stage), a dynamic auction design will be implemented; when the marketing price 
is higher than the fixed price of cloud resource but lower than the equilibrium price of cloud 
resource (when supply equals to demand, the maturing stage), a dynamic auction design will be 
implemented. The following table (Table 1-1) depicts the details. 
TABLE 1-1 
Pricing Strategies of Three Development Stages 




(Fixed Pricing Strategy) 
Developing 
 
Dynamic Auction Design 
(Dynamic Pricing Strategy) 
Maturing 
 
Dynamic Auction Design 
(Dynamic Pricing Strategy) 
 
1.4 Outline of The Thesis 
The construct of this research is outlined below. Chapter 1 is the introduction. A brief 
explanation of cloud computing and information systems is addressed, as well as the purpose and 
contribution of the thesis. Moreover, methods used in the thesis and detailed procedures are 
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introduced and explained. Chapter 2 provides a common understanding of cloud computing and 
game theory (auction design), discusses various cloud computing pricing strategies, and points 
out the unresolved issues related to the extant pricing mechanisms, specifically Quality of 
Service (QoS), such as availability, reliability, latency, security, throughput, capacity, scalability, 
elasticity, etc. Chapter 3 introduces three developing stages (the initiating stage, the developing 
stage, and the maturing stage) in details, illustrates QoS indicators that impact cloud evaluations, 
and proposes the QoS-based reserved model to cloud resources. Chapter 4 illustrate the proposed 
hybrid QoS-based pricing strategies, such as subscription and dynamic auction design, the 
bidding procedure is depicted as well. The comprehensive detailed models and mathematical 
explanations are included in this chapter. Chapter 5 points out several limitations and potentials 
for future direction. For instance, the issues of current cloud pricing mechanisms, the marketing 
condition of supply and demand, the decentralized cloud trading platform, and the impact of 
QoS-based pricing strategy on customer purchasing behavior as an empirical study. Chapter 6 
concludes the study and present some insights of cloud pricing and developing in future.  




BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
This chapter is dedicated to discussing the background of the study. 
 
2.1 Introduction to Cloud 
2.1.1 The Concept of Cloud Computing and The Basic Elements 
 “Cloud computing: A model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model promotes availability and is 
composed of five core technical characteristics, three service models, and four deployment 
models”1 [48-50].  
Cloud computing is not a new type of computing technology, also a new type of network 
application programming. The core concept of cloud computing is Internet-centric, providing 
fast and secure cloud computing services and data storage on websites so that everyone can use 
the Internet. Huge computing resources and data centers can be used by anyone. After the 
Internet and computers, cloud computing is an innovation in the information age. The following 
depict (Fig. 2-1) is a comprehensive view of cloud computing. 
 
 
1 This is one of the popular definitions from NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). 




Fig.  2-1.  A Comprehensive View of Cloud Computing 
 
2.1.2 The Features of Cloud Computing 
In short, the core technical characteristics of cloud computing are mainly reflected in the 
following five aspects [51-55]: (1) On-demand Self-service. If users need cloud services, they 
can run on the cloud platform themselves without having to communicate with the cloud 
provider every time. (2) Virtualization. Cloud computing storage and computing resources have 
been virtualized to users and cannot be accessed directly. As we all know, the physical platform 
Core Technical 
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(1) Service Quality (2) Hacker Attack (3) Information Confidentiality   





SaaS                 
Software as a Service
PaaS                 
Platform as a Service
IaaS                 
Infrastructure as a Service
CommunityHybridPrivatePublic
   
 
11
and environment in which applications are deployed have no spatial connection. It is a virtual 
platform that can complete data backup, migration and expansion of corresponding terminal 
operations. (3) Dynamic configuration. Cloud computing can dynamically assign computing 
tasks to different resources in the cloud, and can also provide resources to different customers 
simultaneously. Cloud computing achieves the purpose of dynamically configuring the level of 
virtualization and expanding applications.; (4) Resource elasticity. Cloud computing can flexibly 
allocate and release resources to meet the different needs of different users for computing 
resources. (5) Technical compatibility. Users can enjoy cloud computing services through any 
form of network access device [3]. It can be seen that the compatibility of cloud computing is 
very strong. Not only is it compatible with low-profile machines and hardware products from 
different manufacturers, but it can also perform higher-performance calculations on peripherals. 
 
2.1.3 The Three Service Models of Cloud Computing 
Generally, cloud computing includes three major categories: infrastructure as a service 
(IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as a service (SaaS). Among the three service 
models, SaaS is the most popular service that most companies are conducting and provisioning 
in practice. A detailed description is in the following figure (Fig. 2-2). NIST clearly defined all 
the three service models. This study also adopts the same thinking to analyze some possible 
pricing mechanisms for cloud services. The extant study always clarifies which service model (s) 
the study targeted at, but this study won’t really distinguish the three service models. Similarity 
and difference among these three service models are not the focus in this thesis. Hence, the 
proposed hybrid QoS-based dynamic pricing mechanisms are applicable to all the three service 
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models, although in practice for a certain service model, the mechanism might need some 
adjustment.     
 
Fig.  2-2.  Service Models and Providers 
IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) provides customers with the computing resources, 
including servers, networks, storage, and data centers. “The capability provided to the consumer 
is to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The applications are 
accessible from various client devices through either a thin client interface, such as a web 
browser (e.g., web-based email), or a program interface. The consumer does not manage or 
control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, 
storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user 
specific application configuration settings”2 [48], [56, 57].  
PaaS (Platform as a Service) provides consumers with a cloud-based environment to 
develop applications. Customers do not need to buy and manage the underlying cloud 
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infrastructure. Such as hardware, software, and operating systems. “The capability provided to 
the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired 
applications created using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by the 
provider. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including 
network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications 
and possibly configuration settings for the application-hosting environment3” [48], [58, 59].  
SaaS (Software as a Service) provides customers with cloud-based applications, which 
customers can access through the Internet. “The capability provided to the consumer is to 
provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the 
consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and 
applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but 
has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications; and possibly limited 
control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls)4” [48], [60-62].  
Currently, many companies are pursuing cloud computing on IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS, 
especially SaaS is the most popular resources. The following table (Table 2-1) lists major 
companies and services. In the real business world, as a cloud-related company or provider, it is 
better to implement all possible services not focusing on only one specific service models, e.g., 
SaaS. More and more companies try to collaborate resources or partner with other companies to 
develop more service models to attract more customers and gain more revenues as possible [62-
64]. Some other type of cloud service is defined, such as Databased as a Service, Analytics as a 
Service, Blockchain as a Service, etc. This thesis still follows the same definitions from NIST 
that depicts the three major service models as the majority; other newly developed service model 
 
3 NIST definition. 
4 NIST definition. 
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also accompanies with the same features of the three major service models. Even to most of the 
existing companies, they have some limitations to develop service models other than the three 
major models, e.g., limited investment and resources, the marketing focus and sales strategies, 
technological preference and information advantages [65-67].  
TABLE 2-1 
Resources of Service Models 
Service Model Products Customer Activity 
IaaS 
(Infrastructure as a Service) 
Amazon: AWS EC2 
(Elastic Compute Cloud), 






(Platform as a Service) 
Amazon AWS Lamda, 
Heroku Platform,  
IBM Cloud Kubernetes, 
Salesforce Lightning 
Platform,  
Wordday Cloud Platform 
Developing and 
deploying resources in a 
cloud platform 
SaaS 
(Software as a Service) 





Adopting with cloud 
services for business 
operations 
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CanGurus Car Sales 
Services 
 
2.1.4 The Four Deployment Models of Cloud Computing 
There are four deployment models (Table 2-3) for cloud computing, which basically 
include all cloud services and platforms [68-71]. The four models are: (1) Public cloud. Public 
cloud refers to cloud services provided to all individuals and businesses. Users can share 
infrastructure, development platforms and application terminals; (2) Private cloud. Private cloud 
is a cloud service for a specific business or organization provided by the enterprise itself or a 
third-party vendor; (3) Community Cloud. A group cloud is a cloud service for a specific group. 
Related groups often have the same needs, tasks, or interests, and related services can be 
provided by companies in the group or a combination of multiple companies. It can be provided 
by third parties; (4) Hybrid cloud. Hybrid cloud refers to a cloud service model that integrates 
the above two or three models. This usually happens when a single service model cannot meet 
user needs [72-74]. 




Fig.  2-3.  Deployment Models of Cloud Computing 
 
2.1.5 The Potential Business Values of Cloud Computing 
The potential business values of cloud computing are summarized from the following 
five aspects:  
(1) Advantages of cost and effectiveness. The dynamic configuration and resource 
elasticity of cloud computing has the advantages of economies of scale, thereby decreasing the 
expenses and increasing the effectiveness of use for users [75-77].  
(2) No geographical or equipment restrictions. The virtualization and technology 
compatibility features of cloud computing can ensure that users can access cloud resources in 
different situations and locations; in addition, work data will not be lost even if a computer or 
mobile phone is lost [78-80].  
Public Cloud
All individual and 
businesses
Hybrid Cloud
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(3) Advantage of flexibility. Cloud computing's self-service and resource resilience can 
bring application flexibility to individual and business users. Cloud computing's low asset 
specificity and low conversion costs also enable users to learn, master, and use the latest 
technologies and business management processes on cloud platforms [81-84].  
(4) Supporting business development and innovation. With the support of virtualization 
and self-service, cloud computing can continuously provide enterprises with various services. 
Therefore, when business needs change quantitatively or qualitatively, companies can use cloud 
computing to quickly expand their business while maintaining the standardization and quality 
stability of the products or services. In addition, the various service functions of cloud computing 
can lay the technical foundation and provide an experimental environment for enterprises to 
conduct business and service innovation. Businesses can continue to experiment and learn to 
maintain strong innovation momentum and capabilities [85-88].  
(5) Emancipating the core resources of the enterprise. Because cloud computing can 
easily meet the basic IT needs of business users, companies using cloud computing can invest 
more human, material and financial resources to develop core and value-added businesses [89-
94]. 
 
2.1.6 The Risks of Cloud Computing 
 (1) Service quality issues. Because cloud resources are automatically implemented, users 
cannot control the quality of service of cloud computing. It is difficult to take interventions even 
if they encounter quality of service issues [95-97]. 
 (2) Hacker attack. Hacking refers to the use of some illegal means to enter the cloud 
computing security system, causing some damage to the cloud computing security network. 
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After the invasion, the operation is unexpected, and the losses caused are also a lot. The damage 
caused is unpredictable [98-100].  
 (3) Information confidentiality. Information confidentiality is the main problem of cloud 
computing technology and the main problem of current cloud computing technology. For 
example, some businesses share user resources. The particularity of the network environment 
allows people to freely browse related salary resources. Information resource leakage is 
inevitable. If the technology is not confidential enough, it may seriously affect the owner of the 
information resource [101-103]. 
(4) Data integrity.  When using cloud computing technology, data may not be stored in 
the same location, rather than in a single system, which affects the integrity of data resources and 
makes it difficult to operate effectively. Another situation is that the service provider cannot 
correctly and effectively manage the user's data information, which will affect the integrity of the 
data storage, and the application of the information is difficult to play [104, 105]. 
(5) Standardization issues. Failure to standardize data and processes across different 
cloud computing providers may lead to issues, such as compatibility, technology application 
flexibility, and strategic planning [106-108]. 
(6) Incomplete laws and regulations. Incomplete laws and regulations related to cloud 
computing technology are also a major problem. It is necessary to improve its relevant laws and 
regulations. At present, laws and regulations are not complete, and the role of cloud computing 
technology is still limited. From the current application of cloud computing technology in 
computer networks, it lacks perfect security standards, lacks perfect service level agreement 
management standards, and has no clear legal responsibility for security issues. In addition, the 
lack of a complete cloud computing security management loss computer system and liability 
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assessment mechanism, and the lack of legal norms also restrict the development of various 
activities, and the cloud computing security of computer networks is difficult to guarantee [109-
111]. 
 
2.2 Game Theory and Auction Design 
2.2.1 Concept of Game Theory 
Game theory refers to a mathematical model abstracted from the political, economic and 
military activities of human society. In this kind of activity, there are participating units or 
people, called participants or people in the game [112-114]. Participants reflect their 
participation in this activity by choosing certain actions. Participants' activities involve certain 
interests of themselves and other participants. This interest is not only related to their own 
behavior, but also to the behavior of other participants. Game theory mainly studies the rational 
behavior of participants in such activities, and studies the final result of the game under the 
premise that all participants adopt rational behavior [115-117]. 
Game theory is a discipline specializing in the study of conflicts and cooperation among 
rational individuals. Game theory was founded in 1944 by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. 
The famous book "Game Theory and Economic Behavior" was published in 1944. But its rapid 
development was in the 1950s. After John Forbes Nash Jr. published two basic non-cooperative 
game theory papers5. Cooperative game theory and non-cooperative game theory are two 
components of game theory, but in recent years, game theory has not only developed rapidly, but 
also has been more and more widely used in economics and other fields [118-120].  
 
 
5 Nash, John (1950) "Equilibrium points in n-person games" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
36(1):48-49, and Nash, John (1951) "Non-Cooperative Games" The Annals of Mathematics 54(2):286-295. 
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2.2.2 Elements of Game Theory 
In game theory, strategic game models usually consist of three elements [112-117]. 
(1) Participant Set: To construct a game theory model, you need to know who participate 
in this activity. Participants do not necessarily refer only to individuals, but also refer to person, 
also include government, enterprise, region, country, etc. The set of all participants becomes the 
set of participants, denoted as N = {1, 2, 3, …, i, …, n}. i ∈ 𝑁 is participants. 
(2) Strategy: In a game model, 𝑠  denotes the participant i’s strategy, such as 𝑆 , i ∈ 𝑁. 
Every participant needs to choose a strategy, constructing a strategy vector s = 
(𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 ) as a strategic set, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 . 
𝑆 = {s =  (𝑠 , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 , … , 𝑠 )│𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 } 
(3) Payoff Model: It is defined as on the strategy combination set 𝑆 , which takes a value 
in the real space R and is expressed as 𝑢 (𝑠). It is used to describe certain gains or losses 
suffered by participant i under the strategy combination 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 . The utility function 𝑢 (𝑠) in 
game theory is controlled not only by participant i, but also by i's opponent. In other words, the 
interests of the participants are mutually restrictive.  
The strategy game model can be expressed as： 
G = <N, 𝑆 ,𝑆 , … , 𝑆 , … , 𝑆 , > 
 
2.2.3 Classification of Game Theory 
Game theory are classified as cooperative and non-cooperative models (whether or not 
cooperation is strongly restricted) according to the behavior of cooperative participants. Starting 
with participants choosing actions simultaneously or at different times, non-cooperative games 
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are categorized into static and dynamic models. According to the participants' understanding 
information of the game itself, non-cooperative games are classified into models with complete 
information and incomplete information. Hence, non-cooperative model consists of four basic 
types: static model with complete information, dynamic model with complete information, static 
model with incomplete information, and dynamic model with incomplete information[113-115], 
[117,118]. 
 
2.2.4 Nash Equilibrium 
In the game model, how each participant chooses strategies rationally, and on the premise 
that each participant is rational, the outcome of the game are the two focuses of debate. In game 
theory, it is assumed that each participant is rational, they can correctly predict the opponent's 
behavior, and under this premise, their own reward will be maximized. Under the assumption of 
participants rational behavior, the participants' reasonable strategy portfolio can be described by 
the following Nash equilibrium [121, 122]. 
Definition 1. G = <N, 𝑆 ,𝑆 , … , 𝑆 , … , 𝑆 , >is a generalized game model, strategic 
portfolio 𝑠∗ = (𝑠∗, 𝑠∗ ),  𝑠∗ ∈ 𝑆  is a Nash Equilibrium. If ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, and 𝑠 = 𝑠∗ , the participant 
i’s optimal strategy is: 
𝑢 (𝑠∗, 𝑠∗ ) = max
∈
𝑢 (𝑠∗, 𝑠∗ ) 
Game theory believes that rational participants should choose strategies in Nash 
equilibrium 𝑠∗. If the participant i can expect that the opponent will not choose 𝑠∗ , he or she will 
choose 𝑠∗, then the opponent's reward may decline. If he or she does not choose 𝑠∗, the opponent 
chooses 𝑠∗, which may reduce your payment. Therefore, each participant i does not deviate from 
the enthusiasm of Nash equilibrium strategy 𝑠∗ [123-125]. 
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2.2.5 Cases of Nash Equilibrium 
Case I. The Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
The police suspected that persons A and B had committed the crime of partnership, but 
there was no conclusive evidence. Thus, the court relied mainly on the confession of the offender 
in the judgment. The specific possibilities are as follows:  
(1) If neither of them admits the crime they committed, they can only be sentenced to one 
year in prison for the misdemeanor found. 
(2) If one of them pleads guilty, they will be acquitted for their good guilty attitude. 
Another person was sentenced to eight years in prison for fighting crime. 
(3) If both plead guilty, they will each be sentenced to 5 years in prison. 
The table (Table 2-2) below shows the payoffs.  
TABLE 2-2 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Prisoner A or B Confess Defense 
Confess 5, 5 0, 8 
Defense 8, 0 1,1 
 
From a mathematical point of view, the theory is reasonable, that is, the choice is 
confession. However, this is obviously inappropriate in the sociological field of 
multidimensional information collaboration. In ancient China, bribery between officials was 
called "wrong rules" rather than trying to find them. This is because the deterrent effect of social 
systems on people's behavior forces people's decision-making to change. For example, from a 
psychological perspective, the cost of choosing a confession will be greater. One side pleaded 
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defense, the other side pleaded defense. Then, the subsequent acts of revenge, and therefore the 
"betrayal" role that is not easy to become an insider will fail him.  
The increase in proportion between 8 and 10 years will be diluted, human dignity will 
cause revenge and slightly undermine the "rules." In order to deal with things that are closer to 
the facts, we must have as much relevant information as possible and reasonably weight the 
analysis. The dynamics of human motion is very complex, so the plight of prisoners can only be 
used as a reference for simplified models and specific decisions. 
According to strategic portfolio s = (𝑠 ,𝑠 ), 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , i = 1, 2. The two persons have the 
identical strategic portfolios, 𝑆  = 𝑆  = {𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒}. The payoffs of the two prisoners 
are: 
𝑢 𝑠 ,𝑠  = 
−5                              𝑠 = 𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠
0              𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
−8          𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒, 𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠
−1                             𝑠 = 𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
 
𝑢 𝑠 ,𝑠  = 
−5                             𝑠 = 𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠
0              𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒, 𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠
−8          𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
−1                             𝑠 = 𝑠 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 
 
Case II. The Beauty’s Coin 
A beauty comes to chat with a gentleman and asks to play games with him. The beauty 
advice: "Let's show the coin's two sides, positive or negative. If we are all positive, I give you 3 
dollars, if we are all negative, I give you 1 dollar, and you give me 2 dollars. The gentleman will 
participate in the game anyway. The potential results are indicated in the following table (Table 
2-3). 




A Beauty’s Choice 
Gentleman or The Beauty Front Back 
Front 3, -3 -2, 2 
Back -2, 2 1, -1 
 
Suppose the probability of front side is x and the probability of back side is (1-x). In order 
to maximize the gentleman’s income, when the beauty’s coin is front or back, the income should 
be equal, otherwise the beauty can change the probability of the front and back sides at any time 
and reduce the total income.  
It is the same as the maximum return when the beauty moves on. Solve the problem, 
which means that there are 3 front sides every 8 times, and 5 back sides are our best strategy. 
Substitute x = 3/8 into the income expression 3 * x + (-2) * (1-x) to get each expected income. 
The calculation result is -1/8 dollar. 
Similarly, we assume that the beauty has a front probability of (y), a back probability of 
(1-y). 
Whenever the expected outcome of the beauty is 2 (1-y) -3y = 1/8 dollar, the solution y is 
also equal to 3/8. This tells us that with the best strategy adopted by both parties, an average of 
1/8 won can be paid for each beauty’s winning. In fact, if the beauty adopts the decision of (3/8, 
5/8), no matter which plan the gentleman will use, this situation cannot be changed. If both 
parties are both front sides of the coin, the expected return is (3 + 3 + 3-2-2-2-2-2) / 8 = -1 / 8 
dollar.  
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If both are back sides, the expected return is (-2-2-2 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1) / 8 = -1 / 8 
dollar. And any strategy is nothing more than a linear combination of the above two strategies, so 
it can still be expected to be -1/8 dollar. However, when the gentleman also uses the best 
strategy, he can at least guarantee the least loss. Otherwise, he will be targeted by the strategy 
adopted by the beauty, and he will lose more. This game model doesn't seem very useful, but in 
fact, it may involve one of the most important models in financial market pricing: the pricing 
weighted model.  
Generally speaking, the foundation of game theory is to explore the competitive 
phenomenon in the form of a game, and to employ mathematical and logical approaches to 
analyze the rules of activities. Because there are game participants, there must be a game ruler. A 
deep understanding of the nature of competitive behavior will help us analyze and grasp the 
relationship between things in competition, and make it easier for us to formulate and adjust 
rules, so that the rules can ultimately operate according to our intended goals [124-126]. 
 
2.2.5 Different types of auction processes 
If a product or service does not have a reference to estimate its true value, an auction 
design is a suitable way to track prices and distribution. Because of uncertainty, we do not have a 
standardized mechanism for adoption; indeed, an auction design can take advantage of any 
uncertainty to overcome obstacles. Game-based auctions can estimate resources to a certain 
degree, relying mainly on participants’ bids rather than on the fluctuations of supply and demand 
[115-118], [124, 125]. The below picture addresses various auction designs (Fig. 2-4).  




Fig.  2-4.  Taxonomy of Auction Design 
An English auction is during the auction, the auctioneer announced an increase in the 
minimum starting price and auction target. Bidders start from the initial bid, from the lowest 
price to the highest price. However, the transaction price should be greater than the reserved 
price. This auction method got its name because it originated in England. England is a 
gentleman-civilized country. When the auction boomed, it became rich. Many rich people are 
willing to confirm their identity and strength in the auction. Such as antiques, artworks, ancient 
books, etc. The identity of the participants has a great influence on their "face psychology", the 
auction site is very fierce, the price increase is very large, and the characteristics of competitive 
price increases are obvious [112-115]. 
Dutch auctions are also called "low-price auctions" or "high-value auctions." This means 
that during the procedure, the auctioneer will announce the starting price and the price reduction 
of the auction target, and then the first bidder will end the transaction. As the same as English 
auction, the transaction price should be greater than the reserved price as well. The auction price 
of the auction target decreases a bidder’s bid wins (equal to or higher than the reserved price). 
Reduced-price auctions usually start at very high prices, prices are too high, and sometimes no 
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one even bids. Currently, the price drops from a high price to a low price until the bidder is 
willing to accept it. If there are two or more bidders responding to the price at the same time, it 
will be converted into a price increase auction. In most reduced-price auctions, there are many 
bids. Because auctions often use reduced-price auctions when the quality is different, the first 
bidder with the highest bid can purchase all items, but usually only the best item can be 
purchased at the highest price. Then, the auction continued, and prices fell. When another bidder 
is willing to accept the bid, he also has the same choice, which is the best choice for the 
remaining choices, and then the auction will continue. In this case, although bidders remained 
silent most of the time, there was still constant competition among bidders [117-120]. 
A combination of British and Dutch auctions. This means that during the auction, after 
the auctioneer initiates the auctioning (i.e., the bidding price and the lowest price), the bidder 
will bid for the corresponding price, the auctioneer will increase the bidding price in turn, and the 
highest bidder will win. If no one bids, the auctioneer will lower the bid and the price, bid 
sequentially, and bid with the first bidder. Also, the transaction price should be greater than the 
reserved price [123-126].  
Sealed-bid auctions are also called tender auctions. The buyer submits the sealed offer 
(also known as the bid) to the auctioneer within a specified time, and the auctioneer selects the 
buyer. Compared with the above two methods, the auction method has the following two 
characteristics: first, in addition to price conditions, other transaction conditions need to be 
considered; second, it can be open-bided. This method can be used when auctioning large 
facilities or large inventory items or items confiscated by the government [121-123].  
Vickrey auctions, also known as second price sealed auctions. This auction method is 
basically the same as the first auction, except that the winner must pay the second highest price, 
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not his own price. This is similar to the agency bidding system used by eBay. In this system, the 
winner needs to pay the second highest bid, plus a price increase (e.g., 10%). In practical 
applications, the Vickrey auction was accepted. For instance, the method of auctioning Treasury 
Bills in the United States has been adopted with. However, their rules allow the number of 
objects to be greater than one, and the number of bidders can exceed one. The rules are as 
follows: when bidders bid, they need to determine the required quantity and unit price. The seller 
ranks all bids based on the total bid amount (from high to low), gives priority to the highest 
bidder, and then determines the price as an allocation that does not meet the target ’s highest bid. 
Because the bidder does not think that all bids have the same price, it is called the unit price 
method. The price is determined by the highest bid price without bidders, so it still retains the 
characteristics of the Vickrey auction, that is, everyone will bid based on their own real 
evaluation [116-120].  
Combinatorial auction is a type of auction. It was proposed in 1982. It is different from 
traditional auctions. This is an auction method where bidders can bid on combinations of 
multiple commodities. It applies to the situation where the buyer does non-cumulative 
measurement of the value of the goods. Compared with traditional auctions, combinatorial 
auctions are more efficient when distributing multiple commodities. The target of this auction 
method is to gain various commodities. The buyer writes a combination of multiple commodities 
and the price of the combination, or the seller provides a different combination, and the buyer 
bids for the combination provided by the seller. This auction method increases the value of the 
combined items more effectively than a single auction [117, 118]. 
Reverse auctions, also known as auction purchases, are commonly used in government 
procurement and engineering procurement. The buyer provides information on the desired 
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product, service needs and affordable price positioning, while the seller determines the final 
product provider and service provider in a competitive manner so that the buyer can get the best 
price / performance ratio. Reverse auction as a common auction method has the following 
characteristics: (1) Because the transaction rules of reverse auction are to win at a lower price, it 
can save costs for buyers; (2) It is said that the buyer ’s purchase purpose is strong, and the 
transaction process is relatively simple and easy to control. (3) Since the reverse auction is 
conducted in accordance with certain rules, for the seller, fair competition among the sellers is 
guaranteed; (4) In the reverse auction process, the price determines who the buyer chooses to buy 
the goods from. Therefore, price is a key factor, and the seller ’s product quality, reputation, etc. 
cannot be used as judgment criteria; (5) Since the seller is rational, the bid price cannot be lower 
than its cost value [120-122].  
For instance, an English auction is a single-sided auction, whereas a combinatorial double 
auction is a double-sided auction. In a combinatorial double auction, sellers and buyers submit 
estimates for bundled objects. Providers have flexible chances to sell items to different 
customers; customers have more dynamic opportunities to purchase bundled items from different 
providers, just as they would expect. Depending on unique features of cloud computing, 
companies have the chance to employ different types of auction [127-129]. The following figure 
(Fig. 2-5) describes bidding directions of different types of auctions.  
 




Fig.  2-5.  Different Bidding Directions of Auctions 
 
2.2.6 Conditions of auction design 
In economics, an auction design could be perfect, such auction is able to achieve to three 
major criteria: Individual Rationality (IR), Budget Balance (BB), and Truthfulness (TF). However, 
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different factors impact the ideal model to be true [130-132]. In this auction design, I focus on two 
requirements: Individual Rationality (IR) and Truthfulness (TF). 
Individual Rationality (IR): All participants (provider and customer) are rational. In other 
words, each participant would seek some benefit through the procedure, otherwise, no participant 
wants to join the auction. For instance, customer i’s bid should be greater than the marketing price 
(P), at least the two prices are equal: 𝐵  ≥ P. on the other side, the bidding  price (P) should be 
greater than provider’s estimation (𝐵 ), to the most provider’s bid  equals to the marketing price: 
P ≥ 𝐵 . In practice, IR is a natural phenomenon that applicable to each unit in game theory [133-
138]. Each participant has the incentive to act in an auction design, because of the potential 
nonnegative gains through bidding auction procedure. 
 𝐵  ≥ 𝑃 ≥ 𝐵  (2-1) 
Assumption 1: 
 𝐵  ≥ 𝐵  (2-2) 
Budget Constraints (BC): No customer would like to pay more than his affordability. In 
particular, the customer i’s overall payment is below his budget constraints exactly. This threshold 
ensures that customer will obtain expected qualified cloud services with reasonable prices. 
Furthermore, different levels of customer budget constraints various requirements of QoS 
expectations. In other words, for customer, his objective is to seek the same level of qualified cloud 
services with a relative lower expense [139-143]. 
Truthfulness (TF): Truthfulness is also known as incentive compatibility (IC) or strategy-
proof [144-146]. Based on Nash Equilibrium, each participant should report a truthful value (V) if 
he or she intend to optimize profits and utility. Otherwise, if some of the participants choose 
untruthfully bidding (𝐵 ≠ 𝑉  𝑜𝑟 𝐵 ≠ 𝑉 ), they will suffer potential losses. Truthfulness is critical 
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in maintain a well-being environment in the cloud computing business: a trusted, fairness, and 
efficient market [147-149]. 
 𝐵 = 𝑉  and 𝐵 = 𝑉  (2-3) 
 
2.3 Cloud Pricing Mechanisms 
At present, fixed pricing strategies are widely used because of the simplicity and easy 
understanding. The adoption of dynamic pricing mechanism is still relatively small, mainly 
because its pricing mechanism is more complicated, but dynamic pricing mechanism can 
compensate the disadvantages of fixed pricing mechanism. For instance, dynamic pricing can 
present flexible prices based upon the marketing fluctuation (between supply and demand) and 
avoid potential loss caused by fixed pricing; meanwhile, dynamic pricing can reduce the trading 
price to balance customer’s budget constraint. As the cloud industry continues to develop, the 
dynamic pricing mechanism will attract more and more participants’ attention and meet with 
various requirements. The following table list some of popular cloud services from different 
companies using different types of pricing strategies (Table 2-4). 
TABLE 2-4 
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Akamai/Alibaba Cloud/Box.net/Linode/OpSource/Rackspace /SalesForce.com… 
 
2.3.1 Fixed pricing strategy 
There are many different types of fixed pricing: pay-per-use, subscription, unit pricing, 
and tiered pricing. Pay-per-use and subscription are the two main fixed pricing strategies adopted 
by companies (Table 2-5).   
Today, cloud computing services mostly follow a very simple pricing scheme, offering 
fixed prices for various resource types. The fixed pricing strategy for different cloud services is 
mainly in one of three forms: pay per use, subscription, and tiered pricing [150]. Pay-per-use, 
which means that the customer pays a fixed price for the unit service used, typically gigabytes 
per hour or CPU per hour. Pay per use is typically used in the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
and Platform as a Service (PaaS) models. For instance, Amazon AWS and Google App Engine 
charge a fee of the service based on usage. Subscription refers to a pre-selected combination of 
service units that are used for a long time at a fixed price [151]. Customers subscribe (or sign 
contracts) and believe that in the subscription model, pricing is based on time rather than usage. 
In addition to pay per use, subscription is the most commonly used model for cloud service. 
Subscription is the most widely used pricing model for Software as a Service (SaaS). It allows 
customers to predict the periodic cost of their use of cloud services, and customers can use the 
service by paying an annual or monthly fee [152]. In cloud computing, tiered pricing mainly 
refers to providers offer multiple levels of services. Each level has certain technological 
specifications (e.g., storage, geographical location, memory, CPU power, elasticity, security, 
etc.) and service level agreements (SLAs). Customers can choose certain level of service to buy 
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according to their needs. Amazon AWS also adopts tiered pricing strategy. Amazon.com sells a 
variety of different types of specifications. Each is packaged into a different storage and memory 
format. Customers can purchase different specifications as needed [49], [153]. 
TABLE 2-5 









Consumers pay for the 
resources they use based on 




Amazon AWS, Google App 
Engine, Microsoft Azure, 
IBM Cloud 
Subscription 
Consumers pay a certain 
amount of service up front and 




Amazon AWS, Google App 




Multiple levels of services 
IaaS, PaaS, 
SaaS  
Amazon AWS, Google App 




There are no fees for certain 
services. Customer can use the 
services for a certain time period 
with no payment. 
IaaS, PaaS, 
SaaS 
Amazon AWS, Google App 
Engine, Microsoft Azure, 
IBM Cloud 




2.3.2 Dynamic pricing strategy 
By adopting a dynamic pricing strategy, suppliers can flexibly modify prices according to 
fluctuations in the market. If the modified price is lower than the fixed price, more customers 
will be attracted since they can get the same service at a lower cost. This will increase provider 
revenue. If the modified price is higher than the fixed price, the provider will also receive more 
revenue due to the higher payment of each service. It is recommended to use a dynamic pricing 
scheme to price the federated cloud resources to compensate the deficits, which are caused by the 
fixed pricing algorithm, for both provider and customer based on supply and demand [40]. 
Hence, dynamic pricing strategies are more flexible and reasonable than fixed pricing strategies. 
It can allocate available cloud resources to meet customer needs and balance customer budget 
constraints (Table 2-6). Compared to the fixed pricing strategy, the advantage of dynamic pricing 
strategy is to adjust price flexibly based on marketing conditions, especially the relation between 
supply and demand. By this way, for providers, they can change price consistently according the 
supply and demand; for customers, they have a great chance obtain the same QoS level of cloud 
services but paying less [155-157]. 
TABLE 2-6 
Dynamic Pricing Strategies 
Pricing Mechanism Pricing Objective and Explanations Article 
Genetic Model 
Cloud Market and Pricing  
Three steps: define, evaluate, and select the best pairs of 
chromosomes. Genetic model is better than some 
dynamic models and fixed pricing mechanisms.  
[109]  





Compensating the deficits  
For the federated cloud resources to compensate the 
deficits based on supply and demand. Benefit to both 




Formulating the competition 
Among providers, seeking more appropriate mechanisms 




Dynamic resource allocation 
Dynamically and effectively adjusting prices for 




Providing high QoS 
Tracking real values of cloud resources to guarantee high 






Especially for providers to maximize revenues under 
uncertainties and incomplete information. 
[161] 
 
2.3.3 Bidding pricing strategy 
Applying economics game theory to price cloud services is a reasonable choice. Price 
fluctuations can reflect the relationship between supply and demand in real time, providing 
incentives and constraints for users to rationally choose resources. At the same time, the service 
price can be used as the basis of resource allocation to realize service differentiation [162-164]. 
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The following table (Table 2-7) addresses the extant study using auction design to pricing 
available cloud resources. 
 
TABLE 2-7 
Different Types of Auction Design 
Type Pricing Objective Article 
English Auction 
Maximizing provider’s revenue and shortening the 
execution time, also solve NP-hardness. 
[165] [166] 
Dynamic Auction 
Coping with changes in cloud market, such as 
Asymptotic optimization, incentive compatibility, 
and computational complexity are integrated to 
allocate available cloud resources. 
[167-169] 
Marginal Bidding 
Truthfulness and dynamic adjustment mechanisms 




This framework enables multiple customers to 
purchase services from multiple providers. The 





and K-Pricing Scheme 
This mechanism is suitable for cases requiring 
various services and where many participants exist. 
A double-sided auction model and K-pricing scheme 
were used in this mechanism. 
[175-177] 




An auction design is better than the fixed-price 
mechanism. Furthermore, a greedy algorithm 




The economic efficiency of the cloud resources and 
allocation is more important to providers. 
[182-185] 
 
2.3.4 Amazon AWS EC2 (Elastic Compute Cloud) Spot Instance 
“Amazon EC2 Spot instances are free computing power available in AWS services. 
Compared with the price of on-demand instances, such instances can provide extra discounts. 
EC2 Spot can help you optimize the cost of AWS services, and can increase application 
throughput by 10 times without changing the budget. You only need to select "Spot" when 
launching an EC2 instance to save 90% of the on-demand instance price. The only difference 
between an on-demand instance and an auction instance is that when EC2 needs more capacity, it 
will issue a two-minute notification and then interrupt the auction instance. You can use EC2 
Spot for a variety of fault-tolerant and flexible applications, such as test and development 
environments, stateless web servers, image rendering, and video transcoding to run analytics, 
machine learning, and high-performance computing (HPC) workloads. EC2 Spot can also be 
tightly integrated with other AWS products, including EMR, Auto Scaling, Elastic Container 
Service (ECS), CloudFormation, etc. Offering you the flexibility to choose how to start and 
maintain applications running on Spot instances”6 [186-195]. Amazon.com is the first company 
that implements an auction-like pricing strategy to cloud services [196-201]. Many scholars and 
 
6 https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/  
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practitioners are attempting to find some clues about how Amazon price the available cloud 
resources by Spot Instances (Table 2-8). 
Amazon AWS disclose Spot Instance pricing data each three month. Based on the 
historical data, scholars try to decode and illustrate Amazon’s dynamic pricing processes. The 
following table summarizes the relevant studies. A study indicates that Amazon AWS Spot 
Instance is one of pricing strategies that offer dynamically changing prices based on market 
changing conditions [202-204]. Wang, et al [205] proposed a specific model Lyapunov 
Optimization as a future pricing strategy for Spot Instance. Singh and Dutta [209] used Mean 
absolute percentage error (MAPE) to predict dynamic changes of Amazon Spot Instances. 
Zhang, et al. [212] constructed predictive control theory for spot markets to resource allocation 
in cloud computing environment. Wallace, et al. [215] adopted with Neural Network to predict 
the spot prices. 
 
TABLE 2-8 
Amazon AWS Spot Instance Study 
Pricing Mechanism Pricing Objective Article 
   




Lyapunov Optimization Revenue Optimization [205-208] 
Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE) 
Dynamic price prediction 
[209-211] 
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Model Predictive Control Theory Dynamic resource allocation [212-214] 
Deep Learning Algorithm (Neural 
Network) 
Decoding and illustrating the 
functionality of Spot Instance 
[215-218] 
 
2.4 Unsolved Issues from the Extant Cloud Pricing Strategy 
 
2.4.1 Issues of Fixed Pricing Strategy.  
(1) Vague relation between supply and demand. Cloud price fluctuated instantly based on 
the changing market condition; in other words, price is an indicator of marketing condition. 
However, fixed price cannot express the holistic picture of price changing trend.  
(2) Potential revenue loss. If a provider employs the fixed pricing strategy all the time, 
the price cannot be modified according to supply and demand. For instance, if the marketing 
price is lower than the fixed price, customers may choose other provider’s services because that 
provider offers lower price that is suit for customers’ budget constraints; if the marketing price is 
higher than the fixed price, the provider who employs fixed pricing strategy cannot change price 
easily. These two situations will lead to potential losses.  
(3) Resource allocation is difficult to be optimized. Since price won’t change instantly 
and dynamically, available cloud resources have great chance not to allocate to customers due to 
fixed pricing strategy. Hence, provider won’t optimize revenues [59, 60]. 
 
2.4.2 Quality of Service (QoS) of Cloud Computing  
Cloud service is the main form of cloud computing, and the quality of service is the 
overall performance of cloud computing. Cloud QoS is defined as "the overall effect of users 
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using cloud computing services. These effects determine user satisfaction.7" The quality of cloud 
services reflects whether cloud services meet Yonghua's expectations and whether user interests 
are guaranteed. The SLA clarifies the rights and responsibilities and establishes participants’ 
trust in cloud business [219, 220].  
Based on the existing pricing mechanisms, both participants are difficult to seek clues 
that guarantee expected QoS performance, especially to customers. As indicated in Figure 2-6, 
many critics are critical to QoS performance. Such as availability, reliability, latency, security, 
throughput, capacity, scalability, elasticity, service & help, cost per customer, etc. In this thesis, I 
proposed a model that includes QoS parameters, availability and response time, to estimate the 
value of cloud resources. It is easy for participants to get a reserved price from the model [221, 
222].  
Customers have their own needs and expectations of computing services, they will refer 
to the cloud service functions and prices of different providers when choosing providers and the 
corresponding services, and strive to balance demand, expectations and costs. Hence, for 
providers, QoS is a critical method to value service performance from perspectives of technology 
and customer satisfaction. Providers can provide different service quality and service levels to 
help meet the different levels of service needs of customers [223-225].  
QoS has different explanations from different angles. Based on the usage of cloud 
services, QoS can be considered as customer expectation and provider guarantee; after providers 
offer cloud resources, QoS can be treated as customer recognition and provider accomplishment. 
Because the proposed hybrid pricing mechanism is constructed for purchasing cloud services, 
 
7 ITU-T Recommendation E.800. Definitions of Terms Related to Quality of Service [G]. Quality of 
Telecommunication Services: Concepts, Models, Objectives and Dependability Planning? – Terms and Definitions 
Related to the Quality of Telecommunication Services. ITU-T Study Group, 2008. 
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Fig.  2-6.  Critical QoS Metrics of Cloud Services 
The cloud computing QoS is an expression about the level of cloud computing service 
quality required by customers and indicates the degree of demand of customers for a certain QoS 
service. Customers do not care about the details of service provision and design, but care about 
the effectiveness and QoS. When describing QoS requirements, customers can use non-technical 
language to express. These requirements are very important to providers. Providers need to 
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design services from the perspective of customers QoS preferences. Providers define the 
customers’ QoS requirements based on customers’ description of QoS and promise to guarantee 
QoS by SLA (Service Level Agreement) [228].  
QoS of cloud computing provided by providers represents the quality level that providers 
plan to provision to customers. Providers use specific technical measurement parameters to 
represent the QoS level that customers require. Each service has a unique QoS parameter set. 
The QoS parameter sets of different services have different indicators, which are used to 
represent different targeted values, ranges and levels. Providers should have two expressions for 
QoS. One is for customer QoS using non-technical or non-professional language. The other is the 
technical or professional expression used by providers internally [228, 229]. The following 
picture (Fig. 2-7) indicates the relation between customer expected QoS and provider guarantee 
QoS. 
 
Fig.  2-7.  SLA between Customer’ and Provider’ QoS 
The goal of cloud resources is to fulfill the requirements of customers and services at any 
time and provide on-demand services to customers. But this is not an easy task. For providers, 
the technical guarantee of cloud computing QoS still faces huge challenges. Cloud resource can 











             QOS-BASED HYBRID PRICING STRATEGY 
 
This chapter is dedicated to proposing QoS-based pricing model. 
 
Current pricing methods are based on fixed pricing strategies. Fixed pricing is simple, 
and buyers are easy to follow and accept. The problems are (1) the price of a resource cannot be 
dynamically modified based on resource usage between supply and demand. Although some 
major companies adopt bidding or dynamic pricing strategies for certain services, it is still 
difficult to understand how the companies price the resources. It is argued that companies priced 
resources based on traditional methodologies not dynamic pricing strategies. (2) cloud providers 
will suffer potential revenue loss due to more potential customers will be involved and price will 
be fluctuated along with the fixed price.  
In order to improve the market competitiveness of providers and offset the weakness of 
fixed pricing strategy in cloud computing, on the basis of different QoS requirements from 
customers, I proposed a hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism that executes both fixed pricing 
strategy (e.g., subscription) and dynamic pricing strategy (e.g., optimal auction design) to 
calculate a reserved price for  participants (providers and customers) and to allocate resources 
among customers effectively and efficiently. Afterwards, the hybrid pricing mechanism has the 
potential to help providers attract more customers with relatively lower price and gain more 
revenues. Specifically, when the cost of cloud resource is higher than the marketing  price in 
cloud market, a fixed subscription price strategy will be adopted; when the marketing price is 
higher than the cost of cloud resource but lower than the fixed price of cloud resource, a dynamic 
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auction design will be implemented; when the marketing price is higher than the fixed price of 
cloud resource but lower than the equilibrium price of cloud resource (when supply equals to 
demand), a dynamic auction design will be implemented. Overall, the hybrid pricing mechanism 
is able to explore both the two pricing strategies’ advantages and to provide supplier and 
customer expected benefits [231, 232]. 
It is generally believed that an appropriate price mechanism is an effective way to better 
allocate available cloud resource. The QoS level and performance of the cloud services obtained 
is directly related to the expenses a customer needs to pay. If the same amount of cloud services 
is used, the higher the performance or the higher QoS level of cloud services a customer requires, 
the higher prices of the related cloud services will be [233, 234]. What the customer pays 
depends on the price of the service conducted by cloud provider as well. The QoS-based pricing 
model can reflect the needs of both providers and customers. Specifically, differentiated QoS 
threshold represents different prices to cloud services. Different prices reflect the QoS 
differences of the resources required by different customers, making the relationship between 
price and QoS more reasonable [235,236]. The price itself reflects the customer's preference for 
QoS. For the provider, the corresponding high-quality service can be provided according to the 
different requirements of the customers’ QoS. It will be attracting more potential customers and 
achieving higher profits. In this section, we address the issue of designing a novel hybrid pricing 
mechanism that consists of fixed pricing strategy (subscription) and dynamic pricing strategy 
(optimal auction design) as an advanced pricing mechanism through which cloud services are 
priced, paired, and allocated [237-239]. 
With abundant resources, depending on customer expectation on different QoS 
expectations for cloud services, customer budget constraints, and actual cloud service usage, we 
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explore performance estimation and quality sensitivity pricing mechanism (hybrid QoS-based 
pricing strategy) to make price setting and resource allocation more acceptable and reasonable 
[239, 240]. 
 
3.1 Developing Stages of Cloud Industry 
This section depicts the three development stages before the cloud market turns to be 
mature. The details are described in figure 3-1. The proposed context is applicable to different 
types of cloud companies and providers, such as large, medium, and small companies. Suppose 
that in the market, supply is stable for all the time. In other words, all available cloud resources 
from different providers can fulfill all customers’ demand. And, demand from customers will be 
increasing from the initiating to maturing stage. The details are illustrated and explained in the 
following (Fig. 3-1).  
 
Fig.  3-1.  Different Developing Periods of Cloud Industry 
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3.1.1 The Initiating Stage 
The initiating stage is between 𝑡  ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the cost 
of cloud resource (C). In the market, there are only a few customers with plenty of cloud 
resources from multiple providers. This stage is not a good time for companies to gain revenues, 
but to attract potential customers. Also, it is not necessary to change the price instantly. A better 
pricing strategy for company to adopt with is to offer customers discount or promotional price. 
An example is Amazon AWS who offers customers free-of-charge for certain cloud services for 
one year. 
In the initiating stage, subscription (fixed pricing strategy) is used to present reserved 
price for both providers and customers. Subscription is a better pricing strategy than pay-per-use. 
For providers, they can offer lower price to attract more potential customers; for customers, they 
can obtain expected cloud resources within their budget constraints. The initiating stage is the 
early development of a cloud-relevant company, it is a good time for a company to improve its 
performance of cloud services and to develop its operational activities in the cloud market. It is 
the time period when customers begin to recognize cloud computing and start to use some 
certain resources with only limited payment. The mathematical proof is described in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1.2 The Developing Stage 
The developing stage is between 𝑡  ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the 
fixed price of cloud resource (𝑃 ) but higher than the cost of cloud resource (C). In the market, 
the quantity of customers will be increasing, due to the growth of cloud marketing. This stage is 
the first time for companies start to gain revenues. But, if a company adopts with the fixed 
pricing strategy, it may encounter potential revenue loss that expressed in Figure 3-1. Hence, it is 
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better for a company to seek to change the price instantly. A better pricing strategy for company 
to adopt with is to offer customers dynamic price. The price will be modified based on marketing 
fluctuation between supply and demand. For a certain customer’s resources, a provider offers a 
lower price, a lower price based on supply and demand will attract more customers to purchase 
cloud resources, leading to the economies of scale. Companies will obtain more revenues overall 
eventually. An example is Amazon AWS who offers customers Spot Instance for certain cloud 
services. 
In the developing stage, a double auction design (dynamic bidding pricing strategy) is 
used to present reserved price and bidding procedures for both providers and customers. Auction 
design is a better pricing strategy than fixed pricing strategy. For providers, they can offer 
flexible-changing price to attract more potential customers; for customers, they can obtain 
expected cloud resources within their budget constraints. Specifically, a dynamic auction design 
is potential to avoid revenue loss in this stage, if more customers would like to be involved in the 
auction process to bid for cloud services. They can obtain high level of QoS-guaranteed cloud 
services, but to pay less compared to a fixed pricing strategy. Providers would continue to 
improve the overall QoS performance to hold the market share. The mathematical proof is 
described in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1.3 The Maturing Stage 
The maturing stage is between 𝑡  ~ 𝑡 . And the marketing price (P) is lower than the 
equilibrium price of cloud resource (𝑃 ) but higher than the fixed price of cloud resource (𝑃 ). In 
the market, the quantity of customers will be increasing, due to the growth of cloud marketing. 
This stage is the good period for companies to gain revenues. But, if a company adopts with the 
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fixed pricing strategy, it may encounter potential revenue loss that expressed in Figure 3-1. 
Hence, it is better for a company to seek to change the price instantly. A better pricing strategy 
for company to adopt with is to offer customers dynamic price. The price will be modified based 
on marketing fluctuation between supply and demand. An example is Amazon AWS who offers 
customers Spot Instance for certain cloud services. 
In the maturing stage, a double auction design (dynamic bidding pricing strategy) is used 
to present reserved price for both providers and customers. Auction design is a better pricing 
strategy than fixed pricing strategy. For providers, they can offer flexible-changing price to 
attract more potential customers; for customers, they can obtain expected cloud resources with 
paying reasonable expenses. In this stage, the number of customers and companies will continue 
to increase. Both customers and providers encounter more challenges. A dynamic auction design 
is potential to leverage both parties’ risks and balance budget constraints and QoS expectations. 
The mathematical proof is described in Chapter 4. The following table (Table 3-1) addresses 
detailed pricing strategies for the three development stages. 
TABLE 3-1 













𝑡  ~ 𝑡  
 
 
Only A Few 
 
Subscription P < C 




Dynamic Auction Design 
C < P < 𝑃  
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Maturing 𝑡  ~ 𝑡  
 
A Lot Of 
 
Dynamic Auction Design 
𝑃  < P < 𝑃  
 
3.2 Quality of Service (QoS) of Cloud Pricing 
 
3.2.1 The Relation between QoS Metrics and Price 
The QoS metrics (X) is consisting of availability (𝐴( )), elasticity (𝐸 ), reliability (𝑅 ), 
security (𝑆 ), etc. The bidding price is based on the reserved price (𝑃 ) that is applicable to both 
seller and buyer. x refers to all possible features that influence the performance of QoS in cloud 
computing, such as CPU power, speed, storage, location, etc.  
The QoS metrics (X): 
𝑋 
A (Availability), 𝐴  
E (Elasticity), 𝐸  
R (Reliability), 𝑅  
S (Security), 𝑆  
… 
The function that expresses the reserved price is: 
          𝑃  = 𝐹(𝑋) = 𝐹(𝐴𝑥, 𝐸𝑥, 𝑅𝑥, 𝑆𝑥, … ) (3-1) 
 
3.2.2 An Example of Relation between Availability and Price 
The availability of cloud computing is one crucial QoS parameter, but it is difficult to 
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quantifiably analyze, because cloud services are implemented through the entire serving process 
in a complicated network that integrates software, hardware, and the related computing techniques. 
Availability8 represents the percentile of the uptime of cloud services [68-70]. Better performance 
of cloud services is intimately related to higher level of availability. A more stable system will 
decrease the number of failures and will lessen the time spent in repairing. 
The relationship between availability and Uptime and Downtime is 
A =  =  (3-2) 
A refers to availability. MTBF (Uptime) and MTTR (Downtime) are the two parameters of 
cloud computing. MTBF is the Mean Time between Failure, and MTTR is the Mean Time to 
Repair [227-232]. Thus, based on the above function, the availability can be increased either by 
increasing the mean time interval between repairs (MTBF) or by decreasing the mean repairing 
time (MTTR). The intuitive way to represent availability is by using the downtime and the Nines 
and Fives, e.g., 2 Nines is 99% and 3N5 is 99.95%. The following table (Table 3-2) is an example.  
TABLE 3-2 
Representation of Availability 
Availability Downtime 
          99% (2-Nines)         3.65 days/year 
          99.5% (2N5)         1.825 days/year 
          99.9% (3-Nines)         8.76 hours/year 
          99.95% (3N5)         4.38 hours/year 
          99.99% (4-Nines)         52 minutes/year 
 
8 The probability that the system will be up and will function correctly in a certain time period. 
   
 
53
          99.995% (4N5)         26 minutes/year 
          99.999% (5-Nines)         5 minutes/year 
 
Ideally, different QoS indicators can be integrated into the price function. The following 
model is an example relation between availability (𝐴( )) and the reserved price (𝑃 ). 
The function that expresses the availability is:  
𝐴( ) = 𝑔(𝑥) (3-3) 
The function that expresses the reserved price is: 
𝑃 = 𝑓(𝐴( )) (3-4) 
 
3.2.3 The Relation between Response Time and Price 






𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑  is the total number of other accepted resource requests between time t and the 
deadline, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑀𝑎𝑥  is the maximum of resources that provider 𝑗 can provide.  
Suppose that provider can fulfill all the accepted customers’ requests. The asking price 
(𝐴𝑠𝑘 ) is proportional to the current workload (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 ). That is, as 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑  increases, 𝐴𝑠𝑘  also 
increases; vice versa. The expression is as follows, 
𝐴𝑠𝑘 = 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑅𝐸𝑉 × (1 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 ) (3-6) 
𝛼 indicates the degree of impact of the workload on the asking price. It satisfied that 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. 
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Suppose that all the accepted customers’ requests can be provided before the deadline. 
The bidding price (𝐵𝑖𝑑 ) is proportional to the current workload (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 ). That is, as 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑  increases, 𝐵𝑖𝑑  also increases; vice versa. The expression is as follows, 





𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑  is the respond time of 𝑄 , which is a dynamic value. 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑  = the current system 
time – the submission time of 𝑄 . After 𝑄  is allocated to customer, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑  will be kept 
unchanged. 𝛽 indicates the degree of impact of the time on the bidding price. It satisfied that 0 ≤
𝛽 ≤ 1. At time t, the customer submits the service request (𝑄 ) and the bidding price (𝐵𝑖𝑑 ). 
In the auctioning procedure, the asking prices are sorted in ascending order and the 
bidding prices are sorted in descending order. If the maximal bidding price is greater or at least 
equal to the minimal asking price, trading between customer and provider happens. The trading 




(𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝐴𝑠𝑘 ) 
(3-8) 
The hybrid pricing mechanism is formalized as follows: 





(𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝐴𝑠𝑘 ) 
 
Subscription Initiating  
Double Auction Developing  
Double Auction Maturing 
 




             QOS-BASED CLOUD PRICING MODEL 
 
This chapter is dedicated to describing the hybrid QoS-based pricing procedure. 
 
Depending on the customer's different requirements for cloud services, suppliers need a 
viable and efficient pricing mechanism that is critical to the allocation and optimization of the 
available cloud resources. For suppliers, customers will bid for their own budget for better 
service, and the suppliers will select customers based on their bids, provide resources for higher-
priced customers and guarantee the cloud’s QoS (Fig. 4-1). For customers, they can freely 
choose resources according to their own needs. However, due to the liquidity of marginal 
customers, whose bidding is uncertain, and it is difficult to estimate the demand based on 
existing bids. Hence, the cloud resource scheme based on uncertain bid auction has the potential 
to improve both system efficiency and optimal profits. 
 
Fig.  4-1.  Transaction of Cloud Allocation and Pricing 
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4.1 Subscription for The Initiating Stage 
 
4.1.1 Problem Statement  
Mathematical Proof of Subscription and Pay-per-use 
The fixed price: 𝑃  
The cost of service: C 
The Price when demand is high: 𝑃( ) 
The Price when demand is low: 𝑃( ) 
Customer Consumption level when demand is high: 𝑋  
Customer Consumption level when demand is low: 𝑋  
Customer Maximal Consumption level when demand is high: 𝑋( , ) 
Customer Maximal Consumption level when demand is low: 𝑋( , ) 




𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 — 𝑃  (4-1) 
 
                   s.t. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ), 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ) 
𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ≥ 0 
(4-2) 
 
4.1.2 Provider Optimization 
Considering consumer optimization issues, cloud service providers will adopt appropriate 
pricing mechanisms to maximize their own profits. Assume that the marginal cost of the services 
provided by the cloud service provider is zero. 
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𝑋∗ = 𝑋 (𝑃( ), 𝑃( ), 𝑃 ) (4-3) 
 
𝑋# = 𝑋 (𝑃( ), 𝑃( ), 𝑃 ) (4-4) 
 
max
, ( ), ( )
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋
# + 𝑃 ) − 𝐶 (4-5) 
 
Where (𝑋∗, 𝑋#) = argmax [𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ] (4-6) 
 
s.t. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ), 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ) 
𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ≥ 0 
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋
# + 𝑃 ) − 𝐶 ≥ 0 
 
(4-7) 
4.1.3 Customer Optimization  
max
, ( ), ( )
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋
# + 𝑃 ) − 𝐶 
 
(4-8) 
Where (𝑋∗, 𝑋#) = argmax [a log (X + 1) +  b log(Y + 1) −
𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ] 
 
(4-9) 
s.t. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ), 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ) 
a ∗  log (X + 1) +  b ∗  log(Y + 1) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ≥ 0
  
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋
# + 𝑃 ) − 𝐶 ≥ 0 
 
(4-10) 
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4.1.4 The Analysis of Different Types of Customer 
The Homogeneous Customer 
According to Cobb-Douglas Utility Function U (X, Y) = 𝑎 log (X+1) + b log(Y+1) 




a log (X + 1) +  b log(Y + 1) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 — 𝑃  
 
(4-11) 
       s.t. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ), 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ) 






, ( ), ( )
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋
# + 𝑃 ) − 𝐶 (4-13) 
 
Where (𝑋∗, 𝑋#) = argmax [𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ] (4-14) 
 
s.t. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ), 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ) 
𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ≥ 0 
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋





9 This not only simplifies the solution, but also explores how the utility function of homogeneous and heterogeneous 
customers (marginal utility is gradually decreasing) impacts on the choice of provider’s pricing strategy. 
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If provider adopts with pay-per-use, the optimal price 𝑃( ) =
( , )
 and 𝑃( ) =
( , )








)] − 𝐶. 
 
Proposition 2. 
If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 +
𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1). And the optimal profit is: ∑ [alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1)] − 𝐶. 
 
The Heterogeneous Customer 
 Heterogeneous customers are divided into two categories. The one is divided into luxury 
customer and poor customer according to the budget constraint (willingness to pay/afford). The 
other category is divided into high-demand customers and low-demand customers. 
I. Luxury and Poor Customers 
Assuming that there are d luxury customers (i = 1) and g poor customers (i = 2), it 
focuses on whether different level of budget constraint impacts the provider's pricing strategy. 
Suppose the two categories of customers have the same consumption upper limits 𝑋( , ) and 




a log (X + 1) +  b log(Y + 1) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 — 𝑃  
 
(4-16) 
       s.t. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ), 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ) (4-17) 
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, ( ), ( )
𝑓(𝑃( )𝑋 + 𝑃( )𝑋 + 𝑃 ) + 𝑔(𝑃( )𝑋 + 𝑃( )𝑋
+ 𝑃 ) − 𝐶 
(4-18) 
 
Where (𝑋∗, 𝑋#) = argmax [𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ] (4-9) 
 
s.t. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ), 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ) 
𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ≥ 0 
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋




If provider adopts with pay-per-use, when d𝑋( , ) > g, the optimal price 𝑃( ) =
( , )
; when f𝑋( , ) > g, 𝑃( ) =
( , )
. And the optimal profit is: 
𝑑
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑔(𝑎 −
𝑎
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑏 −
𝑏
𝑋( , ) + 1
) − 𝐶 
Otherwise, 𝑃( ) =
( , )
 and 𝑃( ) =
( , )
. Meanwhile, the maximum profit 
of provider is: 
(𝑑 + 𝑔)
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
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If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is:  
𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1).  
And the optimal profit is:  
(𝑑 + 𝑔)
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
− 𝐶 
 
II. High and Low-Demand Customers 
Assuming that there are d high-demand customers (i = 1) and g low-demand customers (i 
= 2), it focuses on whether different level of demand impacts the provider's pricing strategy. 
Suppose the consumption upper limits of high-demand customers are 𝑋( , ) and 𝑋( , ), and the 
consumption upper limits of low-demand customers are 𝑋( , ) and 𝑋( , ). Obviously, 




, ( ), ( )
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋
# + 𝑃 ) − 𝐶 (4-21) 
 
Where (𝑋∗, 𝑋#) = argmax [𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ] (4-22) 
 
s.t. 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ), 𝑋 ≤ 𝑋( , ) 
𝑈 (𝑋 ,  𝑋 ) − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃( )𝑋 − 𝑃 ≥ 0 
(𝑃( )𝑋
∗ + 𝑃( )𝑋
# + 𝑃 ) − 𝐶 ≥ 0 
 
(4-23) 




If provider adopts with pay-per-use, when g𝑋( , ) > d, the optimal price when demand 
is high is 𝑃( ) =
( , )
; when g𝑋( , ) > d,  the optimal price when demand is low is 𝑃( ) =
( , )
. The maximum profit of provider is: 
(𝑑 + 𝑔)
𝑎𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
− 𝐶 
Otherwise, 𝑃( ) =
( , )
 and 𝑃( ) =
( , )




𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑔(
𝑎𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
) − 𝐶 
 
Proposition 6. 
If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is:  
𝑎log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1).  
And the optimal profit is:  
(𝑑 + 𝑔) alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1) − 𝐶 
 
Corollary 1.  
Subscription can help cloud service providers get more profit. In other words, 
subscription is a better pricing mechanism than pay-per-use. 
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4.2 Dynamic Auction Design for Both Developing and Maturing Stages 
 
4.2.1 Problem Statement 
The hybrid pricing mechanism is formalized below: 
(1) There exist m sellers, M = {𝑚 , j = 1, 2, …, m}. The sellers (𝑚 , j = 1, 2, …, m) themselves 
are also the cloud providers, like Amazon, Google, Microsoft, IBM, etc. Each provider is 
represented by an agent.  
(2) There exist n buyers, N= {𝑛 , j = 1, 2, …, n}. The customers (𝑛 , i = 1, 2, …, n) are also the 
bidders, who could be individuals, companies, or institutions, etc. 
(3) Second price sealed-bid double auction design. In order to avoid cheating or any strategic 
maneuvering, a second price sealed-bid auction is adopted with. The winning bidder will pay the 
second highest price for the cloud services payment. Customers have more incentives to bid, due 
to less expenses they will pay. 
(4) Individual Rationality (IR): All participants (provider and customer) are rational. In other 
words, each participant would seek some benefit through the procedure, otherwise, no participant 
wants to join the auction. For instance, customer i’s bid should be greater than the marketing price 
(P), at least the two prices are equal: 𝐵  ≥ P. on the other side, the marketing  price (P) should be 
greater than provider’s estimation (𝐵 ), to the most provider’s bid  equals to the marketing price: 
P ≥ 𝐵 . In practice, IR is a natural phenomenon that applicable to each unit in game theory. Each 
participant has the incentive to act in an auction design, because of the potential nonnegative gains 
through bidding auction procedure. 
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(5) Truthfulness (TF): Truthfulness is also known as incentive compatibility (IC) or 
strategy-proof [34, 35]. Based on Nash Equilibrium, each participant should report a truthful value 
(V) if he or she intend to optimize profits and utility. Otherwise, if some of the participants choose 
untruthfully bidding (𝐵 ≠ 𝑉  𝑜𝑟 𝐵 ≠ 𝑉 ), they will suffer potential losses. Truthfulness is critical 
in maintain a well-being environment in the cloud computing business: a trusted, fairness, and 
efficient market. 
(6) Assume that within time T, all customers have submitted a total of s requests, e.g., Q = {𝑄 , s 
= 1, 2, …}. Each request from a customer is consisted of five components.  
𝑄 = (𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 , 𝐵𝑢𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 ). 
Such as, 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡  is the budget that is for 𝑄 , 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  is the submission time of 𝑄 , 
𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  is the running time of 𝑄 , 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  is the due time of 𝑄 . 
(7) 𝑀𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑  is the longest responding time of 𝑄  that a customer can tolerant.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑 = 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 −𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  
(8) The participant's goal is to bid the service for the minimal expenses before the deadline. The 
provider seeks to maximize resource revenue. Hence, the resource provider will raise the asking 
price if possible, and the customer will give a relatively lower bid. 
 
4.2.2 Proposition and Conditions 
 
Proposition 7. 
An economically efficient auction design can get the same profits as a fixed pricing 
strategy.  




A double auction pricing mechanism can generate more revenues than an economically 
efficient auction design. 
 
Corollary 2.  
A double auction pricing mechanism is more appropriate for provider or customer to 
employ than a fixed pricing strategy. 
The detailed proof is in the following section and appendix. 
 
 
4.3 The Bidding Procedure 
 
In this section, the detailed bidding procedure and algorithms are illustrated and 
discussed. There are no unusual steps in the proposal auction design, only the first step is 
different from the classical mechanisms. For instance, the first step is reserved QoS-based 
pricing model, the second step is bids submission, the third step is bids matching, the fourth step 
is winner determination, the fifth step is marketing price calculation, the last step is transaction 
and payment. The detailed procedures are depicted in the following picture (Fig. 4-2). 
 
4.3.1 Step I: Reserved QoS-based Pricing Model 
This step estimates the relation between the QoS indicators and reserved price of cloud 
resources. The QoS indicators include availability (𝐴 ), elasticity (𝐸 ), reliability (𝑅 ), security 
(𝑆 ), etc. The reserved price of cloud service is 𝑃 . The function is 
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𝑃  = 𝐹(𝑋) = 𝐹(𝐴𝑥, 𝐸𝑥, 𝑅𝑥, 𝑆𝑥, … ) (4-24) 
Specifically, 𝑃  is a reference to both provider and customer. Both parties send their bids 
based on the reserved price respectively. The customer i’s bid is 𝐵𝑖𝑑 , and the provider j’s bid is 
𝐴𝑠𝑘 . 
 
4.3.2 Step II: Bids Submission 
Customers provide their bids and QoS preferences to the auctioneer, providers act the same 
process as well. 
Customers’ bids: 




𝐴𝑠𝑘 ,…, 𝐴𝑠𝑘 ,… (4-26) 
 
4.3.3 Step III: Pairing Bids 
Providers have capability to fulfill different types of cloud services along with all QoS 
requirements as customers expected. Specifically, 
𝑋  ≥ 𝑋  (4-27) 
 
4.3.4 Step IV: Winner Determination 
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Customers’ bids are ordered decreasingly, while providers’ bids are sorted increasingly. 
All participants are truthful bidders, aiming at the complete process is monotonic [241-246].  
Lemma 1: If  one customer can win with bidding of 𝐵 , he or she will continue to win for 
any (𝐵 > 𝐵 ) bid. 
 
4.3.5 Step V: Marketing Price Calculation 
Revenue-approximating scheme 
In the auction, the price paid by the winning customer equals the second highest price. The 
pricing rule can attract more customers with budget constraint and avoid strategy maneuver [54-
56]. 
Based on Equations 3-7 and 3-8, a winning customer i’s bidding price (𝐵𝑖𝑑 ) is the second 
highest bids: 





Hence, a winning customer marketing price (P):   
𝑃 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑  (4-29) 
 
4.3.6 Step VI: Transaction 
Based on SLA and the bidding procedure, an agreement between winning customer and 
provider will be executed. The customer pays the winning cloud resource by the second highest 
price, the provide provisions the winning resource through the Internet.  




       Fig.  4-2.  The Detailed QoS-based Bidding Procedure 
 
   
 
69
  CHAPTER 5 
LIMITATION AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
 
This chapter is dedicated to discussing limitations and potential research directions. 
 
5.1 The Issues of Current Cloud Pricing Mechanisms 
Several other interests may attract future study. It would be attractive to establish a 
uniform and fully competitive auction mechanism [251, 252] to allocate resources to more 
customers, like individual, small companies, medium companies, and even big companies. 
Another important feature of cloud service is that we need to carefully consider the reusability. 
Cloud services can also be reused. Some users may complete the tasks before the bidding 
contract, and it is best to resell the resources they have [253. 254]. If there is no effective auction 
mechanism that the users can use, it will be difficult to resell the services because of the time 
issue. Future auction designs can illustrate reusability issues in the algorithms [255-257].  
Providers will compete with each other and will submit bids related to a guaranteed QoS. 
The mathematical issue (NP-Hardness) and the computational complexity should be carefully 
considered, as well [258]. Another direction to consider is to adjust the QoS metrics. We 
employed only the availability as the indicator of QoS of this study. Multiple indicators, such as 
security, can be added to represent the exponential relationship between price and QoS. The 
more QoS metrics that are added into the auction algorithm, the more accurate and practical the 
estimates will be. There are malicious indicators representing cloud QoS [259, 260]. Thus, the 
algorithms embedded with QoS metrics are more complicated than normal mathematical models. 
A potential approach is to implement deep learning algorithms to estimate real values of cloud 
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resources, according to the training layer (historical pricing records) and the output layers 
(estimation results) [261-264] 
 
5.2 The Marketing Condition of Supply and Demand 
In the thesis, the proposed hybrid pricing strategy works only for the marketing condition 
that demand is not greater than supply. This situation is very similar as cloud industry in practice. 
Cloud computing is still on the early stage, more and more institutions and companies are joining 
its development, and more and more users (companies or individuals) are becoming familiar with 
cloud-relevant resources. In the nearly future, cloud services will be more popular around the 
world. Hence, a complete marketing condition, including supply is less than demand, supply 
equals to demand, and supply is greater than demand, should be considered and discussed. 
According to different marketing condition, provider or customer can use distinguished pricing 
strategy to optimize profits as expected. Furthermore, beyond marketing conditions, there exist 
many dynamic mechanisms that can suit for pricing cloud computing, from technological 
perspective, revenue optimization perspective, or economic efficiency, etc. in other words, 
pricing strategy is always a critical factor impacting the development of cloud computing, the 
success of companies, and the benefits of end-users. 
 
5.3 The Decentralized Cloud Trading Platform 
In a cloud environment, application scalability benefits both providers and customers. 
Customers need on-demand and QoS-guaranteed cloud services. The dominant pricing strategies 
of leading companies that market the cloud is to use certain fixed pricing models to sell their 
cloud-related services. Auction design is a viable and an effective method for pricing cloud 
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service. The decentralized P2P cloud trading platform is a good complement to the centralized 
cloud pricing mechanisms [265-268].  
The blockchain and its relevant mechanisms are quickly emerging and are increasingly 
being applied in industries. As a decentralized system, the blockchain has been attracting more 
and more attention because of its popular features, such as decentralization, mutual trust, 
transparency, traceability and unforgeability, anonymity, credibility, etc. [269-272]. The 
integration of blockchain and cloud computing is a good example of a blockchain application. 
The blockchain has the potential to provide a decentralized trading network for peer-to-peer 
transactions. The participants are flexible enough to be able to prosecute transactions through a 
blockchain-based trading system [273, 274].  
Depending on each customer's different QoS requirements for cloud services [68], [232], 
users need a viable and efficient pricing system that is adaptable to the allocation and 
optimization of the available cloud resources. The buyers will bid for their own QoS preferences 
for better service, and the sellers will select buyers based on their bids, provide resources for 
higher-priced buyers, and guarantee the cloud’s QoS. Buyers can freely choose resources 
according to their own needs. However, due to the liquidity of marginal customers, whose 
bidding is uncertain, it may be difficult to estimate the demand based on the existing bids [222]. 
The decentralized P2P cloud trading platform has the potential to improve both economic 
efficiency and optimal profits. Also, the platform can set up a relatively free trading environment 
without unnecessary intervention and avoiding various costs [274, 275]. The characteristics of 
the seller and the buyer can be exchanged through the blockchain-based trading system 
5.2.1 Adaptability of Blockchain in Cloud Computing 
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As a distributed shared ledger, the blockchain implements chained storage by 
implementing one-way connections of adjacent blocks by hash values. Each node of the 
blockchain has a complete copy of the ledger. It is convenient to view and to prove transaction 
data in real time. The openness and transparency of the distributed ledger records can effectively 
maintain data security and transaction smoothness. Using blockchain technology, the anonymity 
of the transaction and the no data caching function provide important guarantees for P2P 
transactions and for two-way interaction [265, 266]. The decentralized verification process is 
separated from any unnecessary centralized intervention, such as auctioneer, government 
agencies, and banking organizations. Its decentralized features are consistent with the non-
central characteristics of distributed resources. Thus, the blockchain-based distributed cloud 
trading system can realize the immediate settlement of benefits, and the P2P direct transaction 
also greatly reduces the intermediate costs [275-277]. In this study, the blockchain platform is a 
hybrid decentralized system that consists of sellers, buyers, and necessary third parties, such as a 
supervision authority or a financial institution. 
 
5.2.2 Theoretical Framework 
The system has been designed into three layers (Fig. 5-1). The user layer is responsible 
for providing user services and cloud service management, such as user registration, user login, 
public and private key management, cloud service transaction information, and user right 
inquiry. On the hybrid blockchain platform, users consist of three groups of participants: the 
seller (provider), the buyer (customer), and third parties, such as a supervision authority or a 
financial institution. Any entity that intends to join the network needs to apply for that right, 
which will be assessed through certain standards for each of the three groups, respectively. Only 
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authorized users can register and access the platform. In this way, nonqualified participants have 
no chance to be involved with the system. The hybrid platform keeps the trading procedure more 
secure and straightforward. The user layer also takes control of the public and private keys and 
the transaction information, in order to assist the involved participants to track the related records 
in a safe and transparent manner. In the hybrid decentralized trading system, the QoS Monitor is 
in charge of collecting, recording, and estimating the relationship of QoS availability and price, 
based on previous trading record.  
 
Fig. 5-1 Blockchain-based Decentralized Cloud Trading Platform 
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The trading layer implements the auctioning procedure. A continuous double auction 
design is embedded in the hybrid blockchain system, and it executes bidding, matching, and 
trading. A double auction offers both buyer and seller the opportunity to bid for cloud resources, 
such that a buyer can obtain a service at a lower price, while a seller can acquire better revenue. 
The continuity design provides users (the seller and the buyer) with more chances to trade cloud 
resources. For instance, for the first time, a deal might not occur, due to the disagreement 
between seller and buyer. Both the seller and the buyer can bid again for another cloud resource. 
Or, a previous buyer could change to be a seller, who intends to sell cloud resources via the 
proposed auction network, because cloud resources still exist after what the previous buyer had 
bought. The detailed auction processes will be addressed in the Section that discusses The 
Auction Procedure. 
In the transaction layer, the blockchain will be generated. Consensus is the core issue of 
blockchain technology in a decentralized environment. The mechanism adopted is DPoS 
(Delegated Proof of Work) [278-280], which defines the stake as proof of the higher price 
associated with the QoS being guaranteed. Specifically, the system will assign the right of block 
ledger to the node that represents the potential winning price associated with the guaranteed QoS 
of cloud services. Under this circumstance, aiming at competing for the right to ledger, suppliers 
will seek to improve QoS or to cut costs of cloud service. To customers, they will obtain higher-
performance or lower-price cloud services. The complete network can process in a virtuous eco-
system. As an important program in the blockchain system, smart contracts include a series of 
transaction information, such as trading hours, amounts, buyers and sellers, and categories of 
cloud service. Smart contracts can update content in a timely manner, based on various factors in 
the decentralized trading market. 
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5.2.3 Peer-to-Peer Trading Mechanism 
The blockchain is a decentralized technology that enables peer-to-peer transactions 
through cloud service providers, cloud users, authorities, and financial institutions as nodes that 
integrate and constitute the blockchain network. The blockchain guarantees transaction security, 
transparency, and data reliability through digital signatures, consensus mechanisms, smart 
contracts, and asymmetric encryption algorithms [273-276]. Blockchain technology ensures that 
any node can implement interconnection and P2P transactions. 
The blockchain-based cloud trading platform estimates the current trading duration, 
based on previous trading time. The blockchain platform confirms the reputation value of each 
node and ranks the values in descending order. The system collects the buyers’ bids and relevant 
information and arranges them in descending order, whereas the system collects the sellers’ 
prices and the relevant information and arranges them in ascending order.  According to the 
reputation value, each node of the buyer/seller will be given a matching range of reputation. The 
platform broadcasts a sorted list, and each node can match the range. The node decides whether 
to conduct the transaction: 1) The node confirms the transaction, and the system reviews the 
transaction. If the transaction is verified, a smart contract is generated. The buyer and the seller 
ultimately confirm the execution of the contract through multiple signatures and credit the 
reputation after the transaction is completed. If the verification fails, it is determined that the 
transaction was unsuccessful, and the node enters the next round of auctioning. 2) The node is 
inconsistent with the transaction, and the system again prompts the node to determine whether to 
adjust the bid or the transaction volume. If the node adjusts the bid or the volume, the previous 
transaction step is repeated until the transaction is completed; if the node does not adjust the bid 
or volume, the transaction is terminated directly. 
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5.2.4 Calculate Node Reputation Values and Matching Ranges 
The value of node reputation is 𝑅 . Each node can select a trading party as the selectable 
range 𝜇 . If a node has not completed a match before the expiration time of a transaction period, 
the system may determine that the node is inactive during the current time period and will use the 
appropriate reputation value as the penalty deduction. Through the list of reputation values, the 
system can not only reward reputable nodes, but also can encourage market integrity transactions, 
and can cancel the recording rights of inactive nodes or malicious nodes to  correctly operate the 
decentralized trading platform [281]. 𝑅 = [𝑅 , 𝑅 , … 𝑅 ] and 𝜇 = [𝜇 , 𝜇 , … 𝜇 ]. The function 











, 𝑅 ∈ (0,1) 
5-1 
𝛿  is the number of node k’s the good reputation, 𝜃  is the number of node k’s real transaction, 
and 𝑡  is the number of node k’s bidding. 𝑅  is determined by the percentage of good reputation 
and the percentage of participating active. The function of 𝜇  is 
𝜇 = 𝑁 ∗ (1 − 𝑅 ) 5-2 
𝑁  represents the number of nodes that finish transaction in a trading cycle. Table V is the 
matching range for the six nodes, according to Table 5-1.  
TABLE 5-1 
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𝐵  Top 10% 𝐵 , 𝐵 𝐵  𝐵  Top 60% 𝐵 , 𝐵 , 𝐵  
𝐵  Top 60% 𝐵 , 𝐵  𝐵  Top 30% 𝐵 , 𝐵  
𝐵  Top 30% 𝐵  𝐵  Top 10% 𝐵  
 
5.2.5 Comparison between Traditional and Decentralized Trading Systems 
Traditional cloud transactions rely on third-party institutions such as banks, with many 
transaction processes that lead to low efficiency and long durations. All of the data, such as user 
account information and transaction history, is stored and regulated in the centralized 
organization's database. The security and privacy are poor; once the database is attacked, the data 
is difficult to recover. Users only have their own records and cannot know the transaction records 
of other users; thus, the establishment of the mutual trust market is affected [282], [283]. 
In a blockchain-based decentralized cloud trading system, each node becomes an 
independent seller or buyer, and each entity is evenly dispersed. The form of direct P2P cloud 
trading has the potential to reduce unnecessary costs, such as power loss and transaction costs. It 
is also possible to conduct cloud transactions between nodes in different regions and to allocate 
cloud P2P transactions across regions [284, 285]. All of the transactional information and nodes 
can be anonymous, to ensure users’ privacy and security. The decentralized platform eliminates 
the need for a central auctioneer, improves data sharing and security, optimizes revenues and 
efficiency, and increases mutual trust between market entities [286, 287]. The following table 
(Table 5-2) briefly addresses the differences between the centralized and the decentralized cloud 
trading platforms. 




Differences between Centralized and Decentralized Trading Platform 
Feature Centralized Decentralized 
Trading Mode Centralized (Auctioneer) Decentralized (No Intervention) 
Resource Consuming High Low 
Transaction Cost High Low 
Data Storage Central Database Decentralized Ledger 
Data Security Low High 
Data Privacy Low High 
Information Transparency Low High 
Flexibility Supervised Freedom 
 
In a cloud environment, the dominant pricing strategies of leading companies that market 
the cloud is to use certain fixed pricing models to sell their cloud-related services. Auction 
design is a viable and an effective method for pricing cloud service. The decentralized P2P cloud 
trading platform is a good complement to the centralized cloud pricing mechanisms [288, 289]. 
 
5.4 The Impact of QoS-based Pricing Strategy on Customer Purchasing Behavior 
 
Another direction is an empirical study that adopts with the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) to study acceptance and use of cloud service in a 
consumer context [290-292]. Our model conducted seven constructs into UTAUT: performance 
expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, facilitating condition, price value, QoS 
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expectation, network externalities, and practical risks. Individual perspectives, such as age, 
gender, and experience, have moderating effects on behavioral intention and cloud service use. 
The researched model is depicted in the following (Fig. 5-2).  
 
 
Fig. 5-2 The Research Model of Cloud-based UTAUT 
 
Based on the model, two research questions will be investigated: 
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The first four variables of UTAUT, performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social 
influence, facilitating condition, have systematically investigated and explained in the extant 
study [290], [293, 294], the other four factors, price value, QoS expectation, network 
externalities, and practical risks, have not yet indicated very well. This study will focus on the 
last four variables. For instance, for price value, consumers are price sensitive whether they have 
budget constraint or not, they would seek to save expenses but obtain the same level of cloud 
resources. QoS (Quality of Service) is a critical indicator to estimate cloud resource value and to 
attract potential consumers [23]. There is no such study in IS to illustrate this phenomenon. 
Cloud computing has the potential to benefit consumers much more, if more consumers join the 
cloud systems. From a company or provider, how to conduct cloud computing platform to 
perform the network externalities of cloud computing is an interesting thinking in practice. 
Furthermore, more and more consumers accept and use cloud services, there exist potential risks 
when using. How to effectively control or avoid potential risks will be always a hot topic 
towards cloud computing implementation and cloud industry. 
2. What different consumer purchasing behaviors between China and US? 
For the second research question, there will be a comparison between consumers from 
US and China, we will collaborate two popular cultural research frameworks together to explore 
the study: Hofstede Cultural Framework [295, 296] and Schwartz Polar Dimension [297-300]. 
Among these, Hofstede Cultural Framework is the mostly used guidance to analyze cultural 
differences between two cultures; Schwartz Polar Dimension will be employed as well, 
especially some of important factors that don’t discussed in Hofstede Cultural Framework.  
The empirical results were from two portions of survey, with the same questionnaires 
data collected from Chinese and American individual consumers. In total, 5000 consumer data 
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are validated and support our hypotheses. There exist several different purchasing behaviors 
toward cloud services between consumers from China and US.  
The goals and contribution of the empirical study are: 
(1) To summarize and explain the extant UTAUT relevant models: 
(2) To construct determinants that impact consumer purchasing behavior toward cloud 
services: 
(3) To empirically validate the derived UTAUT: An empirical test of  
We conducted an extensive survey of individual consumers from both China and US to 
figure out what factors impacting their decision on purchasing cloud services based on the 
proposed UTAUT model. this survey provides important benchmarking information for 
individual customers and cloud providers seeking to understand how cloud relevant companies 
compose their pricing strategies and how to improve the comprehensive cloud resources quality 










This chapter is dedicated to concluding the study. 
 
The pricing mechanism is one of the core elements of a business model. A good pricing 
mechanism is a key factor for the success of cloud industry. The research of cloud pricing has 
far-reaching significance for the development of cloud computing. It is of great theoretical and 
practical significance for cloud service providers to formulate reasonable pricing strategies in 
order to attract more potential customers and obtain more profits. Once applied appropriately, the 
pricing mechanisms can change consumer purchasing behavior and determine the competitive 
position of cloud service providers in the market. This article synthesizes the research on pricing 
strategies related to cloud computing services and proposed a hybrid QoS-based cloud pricing 
mechanism. Based upon the pricing theory and game theory, the hybrid pricing mechanism is 
more beneficial to cloud service providers and customers.   
The proposed hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism has the following advantages. (1) 
Solving Problems of Fixed Pricing Strategy. The price of a resource cannot be dynamically 
modified based on resource usage between supply and demand. Cloud providers will suffer 
potential revenue loss due to more potential customers will be involved and price will be 
fluctuated. The QoS level and performance of the cloud services obtained is directly related to 
the expenses a customer needs to pay. If the same amount of cloud services is used, the higher 
the performance or the higher QoS level of cloud services a customer requires, the higher prices 
of the related cloud services will be. (2) The QoS-based pricing model can present a clear 
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reserved price to both providers and customers. Differentiated QoS threshold represents different 
prices to cloud services; the price itself reflects the user's preference for QoS. Overall, the hybrid 
pricing mechanism can explore both the two pricing strategies’ advantages and to provide 
supplier and customer expected benefits. (3) Attractive to customers. Based on budget 
constraints, customers could customize cloud services as they expect. Customers have good 
opportunity to price/bid the expected cloud services.  
This study potentially plays important roles in academia and practice. This is the first 
paper combine QoS metrics (technological perspective of cloud computing) and dynamic pricing 
mechanisms (subscription and auction design) together. It is potential to offer certain insights 
and guidance for researchers who are interested in pricing cloud computing. For instance, many 
different types of auction can be designed and explored, especially double and combinatorial 
auction designs. QoS metrics are good variables to estimate values of cloud computing, and 
cloud computing includes other technological factors impacting the overall performance and 
price. A hybrid QoS-based pricing mechanism is built to effectively distribute available cloud 
resources based on marketing conditions, such as when supply > demand, pricing strategy is 
different based on marketing price. The pricing strategy adopted with should benefit to providers 
or customers, aiming at achieving better outcomes. The model presents an appropriate reserved 
price of cloud resources, which will be as reference to both providers and customers. Throughout 
the complete pricing process, a provider could easily locate its own pricing strategies and the 
status of its cloud computing development; a customer could easily seek available cloud services 
based on its own QoS expectations and budget constraints. 
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A.1 Comparison between Subscription and Pay-Per-Use 
The cloud service provider chooses the price mechanism and sets the price, and then 
customer decides whether to accept it. Since information services usually experience peak 
periods and idle periods, if customers have different utility functions in different periods, then 
when cloud service providers choose to price, the price settings will be different. For example, 
Amazon AWS sets peak and idle periods based on customer demand, and charges different 
service prices for two different periods. In addition, due to budget constraint and time limitation, 
for customers, the marginal utility is decreasing, so it can be assumed that there is an upper limit 
when customers use a certain cloud service. Since cloud service is also an information service, 
assuming that the marginal cost of cloud service is zero. 
The pricing strategy of subscription (fixed pricing strategy) will be employed in the 
initiating stage. The following steps are the proof of subscription is better than pay-per-use. By 
this pricing mechanism, cloud providers will have a great chance to attract more potential 
customers. Due to the price of cloud resources will be lower if providers adopt with subscription 
as their major pricing strategy. 
 
A.1.1 The Homogeneous Customer 
 
Proposition 1. 
If provider adopts with pay-per-use,  
The optimal price will be: 





 and 𝑃( ) =
( , )
 (A1-1) 









)] − 𝐶. 
 
(A1-2) 
Proof of Proposition 1 
If pay-per-use is the pricing strategy, 𝑃( ) > 0, 𝑃( ) > 0, 𝑃 = 0. 
Solve the first derivatives of the optimal price: 
𝑋( , ) =
𝑎
𝑃( )
− 1 (A1-3) 
 






Then, the optimal profit is: 
[𝑎 1 −
1
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑏(1 −
1
𝑋( , ) + 1
)] − 𝑐 
 
(A1-5) 
Here, because both 𝑋( , ) and 𝑋( , ) have boundaries. When 𝑋( , ) and 𝑋( , ) are the 
maximum, the optimal profit will be the highest.  
Hence, when 𝑋( , ) =
( )
− 1 and 𝑋( , ) =
( )
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If provider adopts with subscription,  
the optimal price will be:  
alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1) (A1-6) 
And the optimal profit will be:  
[alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1)] − 𝐶 
(A1-7) 
Proof of Proposition 2 
When providers use subscription pricing, consumers choose service portfolio based on 
demand and pay a fixed price. i.e., 𝑃( ) = 0, 𝑃( ) = 0, 𝑃 > 0. 
Under this situation, customers would like to choose the maximal purchasing level for 
both 𝑋( , ) and 𝑋( , ). Therefore, the optimal profit will be, 
[alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1)] − 𝐶 
(A1-8) 
In order to optimize the profit, we have, 
[alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1)] ≥ 𝐶 
(A1-9) 
So, the optimal price from provider will be alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1), and the 
optimal profit will be ∑ [alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1)] − 𝐶. 
Based on Proposition 1 & 2, we have, 
alog 𝑋( , ) + 1  > 1 −
( , )
, and 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1) >1 −
( , )
; 
And both 𝑋( , ) and 𝑋( , ) are greater than 0, 
Hence, 
a ∗ log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + b ∗ log(𝑋( , ) + 1) > 𝑎 1 +
1
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑏(1 −
1
𝑋( , ) + 1
) 
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A.1.2 The Heterogeneous Customer 
 Heterogeneous customers are divided into two categories. The one is divided into luxury 
customer and poor customer according to the budget constraint (willingness to pay/afford). The 
other category is divided into high-demand customers and low-demand customers according to 
the demand level. 
 
I. Luxury and Poor Customers 
 
Proposition 3. 
If provider adopts with pay-per-use, when d𝑋( , ) > g, the optimal price 𝑃( ) =
( , )
; when f𝑋( , ) > g, 𝑃( ) =
( , )
. And the optimal profit is: 
𝑑
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑔(𝑎 −
𝑎
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑏 −
𝑏
𝑋( , ) + 1
) − 𝐶 
Otherwise, 𝑃( ) =
( , )
 and 𝑃( ) =
( , )
. Meanwhile, the optimal profit of 
provider is: 
(𝑑 + 𝑔)
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
− 𝐶 
Proof of Proposition 3 
If pay-per-use is the pricing strategy, 𝑃( ) > 0, 𝑃( ) > 0, 𝑃 = 0. 
Solve the first derivatives of the optimal price: 
𝑋( , ) =
𝑎
𝑃( )
− 1 (A1-10) 
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𝑋( , ) =
𝑎
𝑃( )
− 1 (A1-12) 
 






The optimal profits of provider: 
𝑑
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑔(𝑎 −
𝑎
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑏 −
𝑏
𝑋( , ) + 1
) − 𝐶 
max
( ), ( )
𝑑(𝑃( )𝑋( , ) + 𝑃( )𝑋( , )) + 𝑔 𝑃( )𝑋( , ) + 𝑃( )𝑋( , ) − 𝐶
= max
( ), ( )
𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑃( ) + 𝑏 − 𝑃( ) + 𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑃( ) + 𝑏 − 𝑃( )) 
According to Proposition 1, cloud providers need to employ an appropriate pricing to 
optimize the potential revenues. Let’s consider the following function first, 
max
( )
𝑑(𝑃( )𝑋( , )) + 𝑔 𝑃( )𝑋( , ) = max
( )
𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑃( ) + 𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑃( )) 
In order to optimize the above function,  
𝑎
𝑋( , ) + 1
≤ 𝑃( ) ≤
𝑎
𝑋( , ) + 1
 
Cloud provider is difficult to differentiate different types of customers, they need an 
identical pricing strategy to optimize their revenues. Meantime, in order to maximize the utility, 
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the luxury customers would like to optimize their demand as 𝑋( , ), and poor customers’ 
demand will increase because of the decreasing of market price of cloud services. Hence, 
max
( )
𝑑 𝑃( )𝑋( , ) + 𝑔 𝑃( )𝑋( , )  
= max
( )
𝑑(𝑃( )𝑋( , )) + 𝑔 𝑎 − 𝑃( ) = max
( )
𝑔𝑎 + (𝑑𝑋( , ) − 𝑔)𝑃( ) 
When 𝑑𝑋( , ) > 𝑔, the optimal price when the demand is maximal is 𝑃( ) =
( , )
, 
otherwise, 𝑃( ) =
( , )
. 
When 𝑑𝑋( , ) > 𝑔, the optimal price when the demand is minimal is 𝑃( ) =
( , )
, 





If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is:  
𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1).  
And the optimal profit is:  
(𝑑 + 𝑔)
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
− 𝐶 
Proof of Proposition 4 
According to Proposition 2, cloud provider’s asking price to the luxury customer is: 
𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1) 
Cloud provider’s asking price to the poor customer is: 
𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1) 
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Since cloud provider cannot differentiate different types of customers, in order to 
optimize the revenues, the provider has to hold the luxury customers, not to attract the poor 
customers. The asking price to both two types of customers should be  
𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1) 
Also, 𝑎 < 𝑎  and 𝑏 < 𝑏  
Then, the optimize profits of provider is: 
(𝑑 + 𝑔) [𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1)] − 𝐶 
Because 𝑋( , ) ≥ 0 and 𝑋( , ) ≥ 0,  
𝑑
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑔(𝑎 −
𝑎




𝑋( , ) + 1
) − 𝐶 < (𝑑 + 𝑔) [𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1)] − 𝐶 
Hence, cloud providers could obtain more revenues if they adopt with subscription 
instead of pay-per-use. 
 
II. High and Low-Demand Customers 
 
Proposition 5. 
If provider adopts with pay-per-use, when g𝑋( , ) > d, the optimal price when demand 
is high is 𝑃( ) =
( , )
; when g𝑋( , ) > d,  the optimal price when demand is low is 𝑃( ) =
( , )
. The optimal profit of provider is: 
(𝑑 + 𝑔)
𝑎𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
− 𝐶 
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Otherwise, 𝑃( ) =
( , )
 and 𝑃( ) =
( , )




𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑔(
𝑎𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
) − 𝐶 
Proof of Proposition 5 
If pay-per-use is the pricing strategy, 𝑃( ) > 0, 𝑃( ) > 0, 𝑃 = 0. 
Solve the first derivatives of the optimal price: 
𝑋( , ) =
𝑎
𝑃( )
− 1 (A1-14) 
 







𝑋( , ) =
𝑎
𝑃( )
− 1 (A1-16) 
 






The optimal profits of provider: 
𝑑
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑔(𝑎 −
𝑎
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑏 −
𝑏
𝑋( , ) + 1
) − 𝐶 
max
( ), ( )
𝑑(𝑃( )𝑋( , ) + 𝑃( )𝑋( , )) + 𝑔 𝑃( )𝑋( , ) + 𝑃( )𝑋( , ) − 𝐶
= max
( ), ( )
𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑃( ) + 𝑏 − 𝑃( ) + 𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑃( ) + 𝑏 − 𝑃( )) 
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According to Proposition 1, cloud provider needs to employ an appropriate pricing to 
optimize the potential revenues. Let’s consider the following function first, 
max
( )
𝑑(𝑃( )𝑋( , )) + 𝑔 𝑃( )𝑋( , ) = max
( )
𝑑 𝑎 − 𝑃( ) + 𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑃( )) 
In order to optimize the above function,  
𝑎
𝑋( , ) + 1
≤ 𝑃( ) ≤
𝑎
𝑋( , ) + 1
 
Cloud provider is difficult to differentiate different types of customers, they need an 
identical pricing strategy to optimize their revenues. Meantime, in order to maximize the utility, 
the high-demand customers would like to optimize their demand as 𝑋( , ), and the low-demand 




𝑑 𝑃( )𝑋( , ) + 𝑔 𝑃( )𝑋( , )  
= max
( )
𝑑(𝑃( )𝑋( , )) + 𝑔 𝑎 − 𝑃( ) = max
( )
𝑔𝑎 + (𝑑𝑋( , ) − 𝑔)𝑃( ) 
When g𝑋( , ) > d, the optimal price when the demand is maximal is 𝑃( ) =
( , )
, 
otherwise, 𝑃( ) =
( , )
. 
When g𝑋( , ) > d, the optimal price when the demand is minimal is 𝑃( ) =
( , )
, 





If provider adopts with subscription, the optimal price is:  
𝑎log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1).  
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And the optimal profit is:  
(𝑑 + 𝑔) alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1) − 𝐶 











) − 𝐶 < 
(𝑑 + 𝑔) alog 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log(𝑋( , ) + 1) − 𝐶.  
Proof of Proposition 6 
According to Proposition 2, cloud provider’s asking price to the high-demand customer 
is: 
𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1) 
Cloud provider’s asking price to the low-demand customer is: 
𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1) 
Since cloud provider cannot differentiate different types of customers, in order to 
optimize the revenues, the provider has to hold the high-demand customers, not to attract the 
low-demand customers. The asking price to both two types of customers should be  
𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1) 
Also, 𝑎 <  𝑎 and 𝑏 <  𝑏 
Then, the optimize profits of provider is: 
(𝑑 + 𝑔) [𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1)] − 𝐶 
Because 𝑋( , ) ≥ 0 and 𝑋( , ) ≥ 0,  
𝑑
𝑎 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+
𝑏 𝑋( , )
𝑋( , ) + 1
+ 𝑔(𝑎 −
𝑎




𝑋( , ) + 1
) − 𝐶 < (𝑑 + 𝑔) [𝑎 log 𝑋( , ) + 1 + 𝑏 log 𝑋( , ) + 1)] − 𝐶 
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Hence, when g𝑋( , ) > d and g𝑋( , ) > d,  cloud providers will employ subscription as 
their cloud pricing strategy, because of the revenues from subscription is greater than that of pay-
per-use. Therefore, cloud providers could obtain more revenues if they adopt with subscription 
instead of pay-per-use. 
According to the mathematical proof of two categories of customers, homogeneous and 
heterogeneous customers, it is clearly indicating that subscription can generate more revenues 
than pay-per-use. In practice, mor and more cloud-relevant companies employ subscription 
instead of pay-per-use, to potentially reduce the marketing price of cloud resources and make 
more profits. Customers would like to seek any less expensive cloud resources of the same QoS 
through the pricing strategy of subscription as well. Therefore,  
 
Corollary 1. 
Subscription can help cloud service providers obtain more revenues. In other words, 
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Lemma 1: If  one customer can win with bidding of 𝐵 , he or she will continue to win for 
any (𝐵 > 𝐵 ) bid. 
Proof.    
For a winning customer (𝑖), his or her bidding density is 𝑑  = , and expenses is 𝑃 =  
× 𝑄 × 𝑂 . 𝑂  are other factors that impacting the value of cloud resources but not considered in 
the proposed mechanisms. 
The winning customer (𝑖) would involve in more auctions to purchase more cloud services. 
According to the payment function, if the customer wants to win again, the customer has two ways 
to do that: lifting the bid (𝐵 ) or reducing sum of services (𝑄 ). Such as:  
If 
𝐵 > 𝐵   
Then 
 
 𝑑  =  > 𝑑  =  
(A2-1) 
If 
𝑄 < 𝑄 , 
Then 
 
 𝑑  =  > 𝑑  =  
(A2-2) 
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Hence, the monotonicity can guarantee the winning customer obtain more cloud resources, 
if the customer doesn’t have a limited budget constraint, because more cloud resources need more 
affordable investment,  even though the customer may have chance to pay by the second highest 
price that is less than his or her own bid 
 
A.2.2 A Double Auction is better than Subscription 
Proof. 
A provider j’s utility (𝑈 ) is, 
  𝑈  =𝐵 -𝑃  (A2-3) 
A customer i’s utility (𝑈 ) is, 
  𝑈 =𝐵  - 𝐵  (A2-4) 
 
The price of an economic efficiency mechanism (𝑃 ) is  





The trading price of a double auction (𝑃) is  
  𝑃 =  (A2-6) 
                                           
Proposition 7. 
The utility of an economically efficient auction (𝑈 ) equals to the utility of a fixed price 
(𝑈 ). 
 




The utility of a double auction (𝑈 ) is better than that of an economically efficient auction 
(𝑈 ). 
 
Corollary 2.  
Compared with subscription, a double auction generates more revenues. 
For customer i, the utility of a double auction minus the utility of a fixed pricing is:  
 𝑈 – 𝑈  (A2-7) 
Specifically, 
 𝑈  = 𝐵  - 𝐵  (A2-8) 
 𝑈 = 𝑈  =  𝐵  -  𝑃  (A2-10) 
 
𝑈 – 𝑈  =   
 
 - 𝐵  
(A2-11) 
Based on the Assumption  
(𝐵  ≥ 𝐵 ) 
And,  
𝐵 ≥  𝐵 ， 
Thus,  
𝑈 – 𝑈 ≥ 0 
Therefore, Corollary 2 is proved: a double auction generates more revenues than 
subscription.  
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